notes-first seminary

Mind  and Time

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MIND  standpoint: EGO SUM QUI SUM

First Chapter of Speculum mentis I: Self & MIND

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KNOWLEDGE  Perspectives

Second Chapter of Speculum mentis II: THE MAP KNOWLEDGE

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ORIENTATION  Frame of reference

Third Chapter 0f Speculum mentis III: GNOSIS

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PROJECTION & VISION Future of Humanity

Fourth Chapter of Speculum mentis IV: TIME & MIND

 

 

 “Ve alleme âdemelesmâe küllehâ

Quran, Bakara/31

naming.

“God has conceded two sights to a man-

One of man’s whole work, time’s completed plan,

The other of the minute’s work, man’s first

Step to the plan’s completeness.”

from Browning’s Sordello

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“in culpa est animus qui se non effugit unquam”

that mind is at fault which never escapes itself

Horace

True wisdom is less presuming than folly.

The wise man doubteth often, and changeth his mind;

the fool is obstinate, and doubteth not;

he knoweth all things but his own ignorance.

Akhenaton

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. “What is necessarily determined in Space,

is contingent, in Time.”

A Turkish Mystic

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Speculum mentis/ GUIDEMAP of “Ego sum qui sum”

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8 All things are hard: man cannot explain them by word. The eye is not filled with seeing, neither is the ear filled with hearing. cunctae res difficiles non potest eas homo explicare sermone non saturatur oculus visu nec auris impletur auditu

In order to expound my ‘speculum mentis’, the mirror of my mind, I will initiate by drawing a guiding map of the mind and the knowledge.

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/about-my-philosophy/ego-sum-qui-sum-guidemap/

per speculum videmus in aenigmate;

et ex parte cognoscimus,

 et ex parte prophetamus.”

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MIND  my standpoint: EGO SUM QUI SUM

First Chapter of Speculum mentis I: Self & MIND

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  • Identity, Self-awareness, Self & Mind

We need guiding principles for an orientation which is the outcome of a special perspective. Hence, the standpoint is the most decisive factor of any historical research. If the standpoint is accepted as the personality of the man; then, the results he gets from his historical search are the natural outcomes of his choices. I can add that if you employ an ‘intensional logic’ to evaluate the predicates of propositions, your mind might be restricted by your value-added language too. But you have to see yourself from outside and go beyond your limitations; “in culpa est animus qui se non effugit unquam.”: The guilty party is the mind which never escapes itself.

Story of Moses as a metaphore of  identity problem and self-identiy

In order to expound my ‘speculum mentis’, what I see in the mirror of my mind,  I will draw your attention to a very strange and famous story which is about the life of Moses, as it was told in the book of Genesis. Because it seemed to me, as if, this story included the most illustrative metaphore which could be interpereted in such a way that would be a rich source for a critical discussion of consciousnes; there is a rich, resourceful cultural heritage about this story which illuminates the self-identity problem  and the real identiy of absolute selfhood…

Verba sunt speculum mentis. ‘The words are the looking-glass of the heart,’ they show what is within.

Once, I was writing an article about “Man, Existence and Time”; and I was willing to stress the problem of ever changing body of human self, comparing it with the changeless self-identity of God. And naturally, I had chosen the famous phrase “ego sum qui sum” as the opening sentence of that article. And though I was not sure then, I felt that this phrase is spoken from such an altitude and has such a high magnitude and quality that it could be uttered only by God, and probably on Mount Sinai. And then, although I repeatedly looked at the Torah to find this phrase I had failed to locate it, so then I stated it reluctantly as “It is said that, God said to Moses: ‘I AM WHO AM’ at the Mount Sinai.”

. Here is the details of the story as it was told in Old Testament, Exodus 3:14:

1 Now Moses fed the sheep of Jethro, his father in law, the priest of Madian: and he drove the flock to the inner parts of the desert, and came to the mountain of God, Horeb. 

There the angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire out of a bush; he looked, and the bush was blazing, yet it was not consumed. 3

2 And the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush: and he saw that the bush was on fire, and was not burnt. 
3 And Moses said: I will go, and see this great sight, why the bush is not burnt. 
4 And when the Lord saw that he went forward to see, he called to him out of the midst of the bush. and said: Moses, Moses. And he answered: Here I am. 
5 And he said: Come not nigh hither, put off the shoes from thy feet; for the place, whereon thou standest, is holy ground. 
6 And he said: I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. Moses hid his face: for he durst not look at God. 
7 And the Lord said to him: I have seen the affliction of my people in Egypt, and I have heard their cry because of the rigour of them that are over the works; 
8 And knowing their sorrow, I am come down to deliver them out of the hands of the Egyptians, and to bring them out of that land into a good and spacious land, into a land that floweth with milk and honey, to the places of the Chanaanite, and Hethite, and Amorrhite, and Pherezite, and Hevite, and Jebusite. 
9 For the cry of the children of Israel is come unto me: and I have seen their affliction, wherewith they are oppressed by the Egyptians. 
10 But come, and I will send thee to Pharao, that thou mayst bring forth my people, the children of Israel, out of Egypt. 
11 And Moses said to God: Who am I that I should go to Pharao, and should bring forth the children of Israel out of Egypt? 
12 And he said to him: I will be with thee; and this thou shalt have for a sign that I have sent thee: When thou shalt have brought my people out of Egypt, thou shalt offer sacrifice to God upon this mountain. 
13 Moses said to God: Lo, I shall go to the children of Israel, and say to them: The God of your fathers hath sent me to you. If they shall say to me: What is his name? What shall I say to them? 
14 dixit Deus ad Mosen EGO SUM QUI SUM ait sic dices filiis Israhel qui est misit me ad vosGod said to Moses: I AM WHO I AM. He said: Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: HE WHO IS, hath sent me to you.  “I am has sent me to you.”
15 And God said again to Moses: Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: The Lord God of your fathers the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob hath sent me to you; this is my name for ever, and this is my memorial unto all generations. 

 

“Ego sum qui sum”, (“ʼèhyè ʼăšèr ʼèhyè, אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה in hebrew and translated into arabic

as أَهْيَهِ الَّذِي أَهْيَه ) ) translated as “I am who I am”, “I am what I am” or “I am what I will be”. Thus defined self-identity of God with this semantically self-referential name. This is an act of true “Naming” of the selfhood of God by Jahve himself. Name means identity, since we have to name something to identify it’s individual existence which differs from everything else. Aforementioned “naming” phrase is true by definition being an auto-logical and tautological statement (simply because of saying the same thing twice) “I am who I am”. From the semantical viewpoint, again, “Naming something” is an important act which is considered as a magical act which empowers you to control the thing implied by the name. “Naming” enables us to describe and distinguish the “identity” of an individualized entity. Here is the first naming of Yahve which could be interpreted almost as “who he is” (ya huve\ yâ hû: which turkish people use too much in daily language ) in arabic. “Ego sum qui sum” reminds me the famous dictum of Hallac: “Ene’l-Hak”: (I am truth, I exist absolutely forever without change). Again, when Caliph Ali hears the dictum that “Once there was God and nothing else besides him”, he replies that; “el-ân kemâ kâne”: “now is the same as before”. That is, nothing changed in this present time too, there is no real existence except God.

 

The word Ehyeh  literally means “I will be”. This is a name given by God to identify himself in the Burning Bush, the importance of this phrase stems from the Hebrew conception of monotheism that God exists by himself for himself, and is the uncreated Creator who is independent of any concept, force, or entity; therefore “I am who I am” (ongoing, permanent).

 

 

existential Standpoint: cosmic consciousness: Ego sum qui sum: “Dixit Deus ad Mosen: ‘ego sum qui sum’, ait; ’sic dices filiis Israhel ‘qui est’ misit me ad vos’ .”:…

Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh

“God said to Moses, ‘Ehyeh asher ehyeh’ (I will be what I will be), and He said, “So shall you say to the children of Israel, ‘Ehyeh’ (I will be) has sent me to you.”

 

Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh in Hebrew. This is a Divine Name (Shevuoth 35a), and it is therefore not translated by the Targum. It denotes that God has absolute existence (Moreh Nevukhim 1:63; cf. Septuagint), and that He is outside the realm of time (Sforno). According to the Kabbalists, this Name denotes the Crown (Kether) of creation, that is, the very first thought and impulse of Will that initiated the creative process. Hence it is ‘I will be,’ since at the time of that impulse, everything was in the future. This first thought is identified with the idea of Israel (Bereshith Rabbah 1:5; Berakhoth 6a; Tikkuney Zohar 17a; see God Man and Tefillin, p. 35 ff.). This name was revealed now that God was about to create the nation Israel.

 

 

Philo : And God said, “At first say unto them, ‘I am (egō eimi) THE BEING’, (ho ōn, nominative of ontos) that, when they have learnt that there is a difference between THE BEING (ontos, genitive of ho ōn) and that-that-is-not (mee ontos), they may be further taught that there is no name whatever that can properly be assigned to Me (ep’ emou kuriologeitai), to whom (hoi) only (monoi) belongs (prosesti) the existence (to einai). (Philo Life Of Moses Vol.1 :75

  • ho Ōn, “He who is” (Philo, Life of Moses I 75)
  • to Ōn, “the Being who is” (Philo, Life of Moses II 67),
  • tou Ontos, “of Him that is” (II 99)
  • tou Ontos, “of the Self-Existent” (II 132)
  • to Ōn, “the Self-Existent” (II 161)
  • This usage is also found in the New Testament:
  • Rev 1:8 I am the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, the BEING (ho ōn), and THE WAS (ho ēn), and THE IS TO COME (ho erchomenos), the Almighty (ho pantokrator).
  • Rev 4:8 holy, Lord God Almighty, the WAS (ho ēn), and the BEING (ho ōn), and the IS TO COME (ho erchomenos).

 

 

Moreover, it is semantically a self-referential identity which refers to its own existence as an absolute self which in turn indicates that instead of pronouncing a name it refers to an absolute, changeless self. That is, it implies an absolute self who can last forever without recurring any change in his personal-identity. It implies that only God has this kind of absolute ego; a personal-identity which can last forever permanently without any change whatsoever. Then only God can truly say “ego sum qui sum”: I will be what I will be, since only his identity can remain eternally. İt is not going to die or change in time. This is why, in our culture, customarily every gravestone has this inscription on it which states: “Huve’l-Baki”: He(God) is permanent forever. Self-identity of God – will remain eternally as the same identity if we recall what he says in Hebrew: “I will be what I will be”: The same meaning is expressed in Quran as:

هُوَ الْأَوَّلُ وَالْآخِرُ وَالظَّاهِرُ وَالْبَاطِنُ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمٌ:

“He is the first and the last and he is the seen (open secret) of the observable existence and he is the hidden (immanent) truth of existence and he knows everything.”

 

This is not only a remarkable act of naming which is pronounced self-referentially by God himself; being so, this name should be the most definitive, and changeless identity of God; “Ego Sum Qui Sum” (I am what I am, I am who I am, I will be what I will be, I am identical to my self=identity) but also implies an unchanging self, an absolute existence everlasting without any change. This is why that phrase, “ego sum qui sum”, has often been interpreted with many philosophical, theological and mystical implications.

 

I have started to think with this example in mind, then I thought this phrase could be interpreted in such a way that this kind of self-reference to the existence and identity of any entity could be used to make an auto-logical description. Not only for the true identity and existence of selfhood but also physical existence of nature. Here lies the real essence of the self-ness; it is known by itself, it is what it is; intuitively felt but not observable by any physical means. Selfhood comes first and felt before everything else; it is known by self-awareness, by itself; then the identity of this self, in this sense, should include not only Mind and Body of an individuality, but also some other Personality attributes if they continue in time without change (e.g. though the parts of body changes in time, it goes on with the same DNA).

 

 

According to the Gospel of Mary, Jesus himself articulates the essence of Nous (Arabic ‘aql) :

“There where is the nous, lies the treasure.” Then I said to him: “Lord, when someone meets you in a Moment of Vision, is it through the soul [psychē] that they see, or is it through the spirit [pneuma]?” The Teacher answered: “It is neither through the soul nor the spirit, but the nous between the two which sees the vision…”

The Gospel of Mary, p. 10

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nous

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equated to intellect or intelligence, is a philosophical term for the faculty of the human mind which is described in classical philosophy as necessary for understanding what is true or real. The three commonly used philosophical terms are from Greekνοῦς or νόος, and Latin intellectus and intelligentiarespectively. To describe the activity of this faculty, apart from verbs based on “understanding”, the word “intellection” is sometimes used in philosophical contexts, and the Greek words noēsis and noein are sometimes also used. This activity is understood in a similar way, at least in some contexts, to the modern concept intuition.

In philosophy, common English translations include “understanding” and “mind“; or sometimes “thought” or “reason” (in the sense of that which reasons, not the activity of reasoning).[2] HYPERLINK “https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nous”[3] It is also often described as something equivalent to perception except that it works within the mind (“the mind’s eye“).[4] It has been suggested that the basic meaning is something like “awareness”.[5] In colloquial British Englishnous also denotes “good sense“, which is close to one everyday meaning it had in Ancient Greece.

This diagram shows the medieval understanding of spheres of the cosmos, derived from Aristotle, and as per the standard explanation by Ptolemy. It came to be understood that at least the outermost sphere (marked “Primũ Mobile“) has its own intellect, intelligence or nous – a cosmic equivalent to the human mind.

In Aristotle’s influential works, the term was carefully distinguished from sense perception, imagination and reason, although these terms are closely inter-related. The term was apparently already singled out by earlier philosophers such as Parmenides, whose works are largely lost. In post-Aristotelian discussions, the exact boundaries between perception, understanding of perception, and reasoning have not always agreed with the definitions of Aristotle, even though his terminology remains influential.

In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness which allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do. This therefore connects discussion of nous, to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the sameuniversal categories the same logical ways. Deriving from this it was also sometimes argued, especially in classical and medieval philosophy, that the individual nous must require help of a spiritual and divine type. By this type of account, it came to be argued that the human understanding (nous) somehow stems from this cosmic nous, which is however not just a recipient of order, but a creator of it. Such explanations were influential in the development of medieval accounts of God, the immortality of the soul, and even the motions of the stars, in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, amongst both eclectic philosophers and authors representing all the major faiths of their times.

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Continuing Personal identity : consciousness and its implications 2 daniel robinson (shared with google drive)

Locke’s example of prince and cobbler thought experiment

At least our dna remains essentially unchanged

But, according to some contemporary physicalists, the mind and the brain of a person is identical; selfhood might only be a construction of the Mind (probably constructed by neo-cortex) and there is nothing which transcends one’s brain, neither real selfhood nor soul.

 

I think there is a semantical confusion here. Selfhood (nephesh in Hebrew, nephes in Arabic) means Ego, identity of the nefs which owns the mind, but it also means a living (breathing) creature. Nefs means soul in Arabic, Aristotle means the same thing when he says “de anime”. These denotations of this semantical concepts could also be useful to investigate; but most of the problems related with mind and consciousness appears to come into existence because of the paradigm shifts in the modern mentality, rather than semantical confusions of the conceptions. Semantical concepts or paradigms which we use as tools of thinking may change the particular solutions and outcomes in accordance with their functionalities. This is why I began with recalling this story of Moses. Again, there is another interesting story of identity in the Old Testament: According to the narration, in the beginning, Moses did not even know his personal identity; he was brought up as an Egyptian Prince, the son of the Pharaoh’s sister, but later on accidentally learned that he was a Jew in fact.

 

I assume that, before the beginning of a quest for meaning, one must initiate to analyse the content of his own Mind and Soul, that is, the real nature of his selfhood. I have chosen this narration about the naming of God’s identity because it is an illuminative example to introduce the semantical meaning of selfhood. I have to choose a proper standpoint to view all this terra incognita of history, since it will determine my perspective. Perspective means both the content and understanding of a mind and the perspective of a Mind is also determined by its chosen standpoint. Perpective means to have special world, special to the perceiving mind constructed intentionally by that mind. This is why we should pay attention to our standpoint before beginning to explore the unknown territory. Thus, from my viewpoint this self-referential description of Ego (I, me-ness in latin)  as “ego sum qui sum”: is a good beginning which illustrates the unmeasurable difficulties of the self-conception beginning instantly from the tautological definition of the word (ego) itself.  From this point of view, I have come to this conclusion that I should primarily try to comprehend the nature of the identity of selfhood, (e.g., is it identical with brain or not) so I have to investigate the subject using as many diverse perspectives of different disciplines as possible. At first we should be aware of semantical difficulties of naming and identifying the subjects of our thought and abstraction levels of its conceptions. I feel there are logical and mathematical aspects of it too. To be sure a Philosophical analysis needs the information coming from scientific investigations. It is known that at present scientific knowledge and perspective we cannot fully explain human consciousness, especially, qualia, self-awareness, attention and self-reference as ego let alone free-will.

Needless to say History of the subject and a conspective view of philosophy of history would be illuminating and I think this subject needs to be reconsidered from the perspectives of art, theology and mystical experience also.

 

 

I am going to reiterate that, I have begun with this sacred name of God because I wanted to begin with the concept of Ego as my standpoint. This story is beautifully illustrates the importance of the chosen standpoint for a suitable perspective. Let us recall here again, according to this narration, how Moses sees the light and wishes to know what happens over there on the bush, what is the identity behind that event. That means a perspective should be framed beginning from this standpoint: id est “EGO”.  Because knowledge also begins with the self-awareness of the mind which denotes to a “self” (ego) behind that mind. But can a person analyse its own Mind? We have to remember here that Descartes also begins to construct his philosophy with the famous motto, “cogito; ergo, sum”: I think therefore I am. It is usually translated as “I think; therefore, I exist”. I had once rephrased this dictum, in the context of an article which I wrote many years ago, that it should be understood as “I am aware of myself; therefore, I exist” (eş’uru izen ene mevcudün), because, here, the thinking mind (cogito) is self-aware and already grammatically referring to its own “ego” as “I” think… Ego sum, ego existo. I learned later on that Descartes himself also had already made this inference (in Meditation II):   “… hoc pronuntiatum: ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum.” “… this proposition: I am, I exist, whenever it is uttered from me, or conceived by the mind, necessarily is true.” This statement sometimes given as “dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum”. He says “ it is certain that I /that is, my mind, by which I am what I am/, is entirely and truely distinct from my body, and may exist without it.” Discourse on method…What is this “res cogitans” (a thinking thing)? I think this might be the hardest question of knowledge both for science and philosophical analysis. I remember a dictum here by St Augustin: Si fallor, sum (“If I am mistaken, I am”). Naturally, Scientific and Philosophical elucidations of knowledge requires semantical, logical and mathematical analyses, but the problem of consciousness and selfhood comes first and demands artistical, historical, theological analyses including an analyses of intuitive and instinctive konowledge because of the nature of mystical experience and meditations. What is this self-consciousness? Every self-aware consciousness naturally ensures itself that it is aware of its own self-identity and conceives that its self-identity differs from everything else which is perceived by deciphering the impulses coming via the sensory organs. In short, my consciousness, self-awareness of my own Mind, makes me believe that “ego sum qui sum”: I am who I am, therefore I am conscious of my selfhood and my body; thus, I am different from whatever I perceive with my sensory organs which come from my surroundings. I also am aware that they are definitely different from my self-identity which conceives them. We are absolutely sure of this fact when we are consciously aware of ourselves, but how can anyone be sure that he is not in a dream-state or have some delusions like hallucinations.

There is a hard question: Why neural activity of brain accompanied by an internal subjective experience? Why do we have some subjective feelings of pain which is called qualia? And here comes the hardest question of consciousness, why do we have this internal subjective experience as awareness, attention and self-reference as the experiencing self of this consciousness? Whatever felt or happens in our conscious state we experience it subjectively as I experience it; it is happening to a “me”

 

Descartes legacy john Searle (shared by using google drive)

Internet is a better example than computer and software see “insan varlık ve zaman”

 

It also is my self-awareness which ensures me that “I am”, “me-ness, my identity”, truly exists and seems an uncompromising reality which I am not able to deny: ego sum, ego existo, since I am decisively conscious of my self-hood and whatever my consciousness conceives as long as I am aware of myself. This seems to me an undeniable fact because here the conceiver and the conceived become the same thing, since the mind refers to itself as the content of its consciousness. One cannot deny his self-awareness of the content of his own conscious. As a result, I cannot doubt my self-consciousness and what it conceives. I can simply state that “I am”, “I exist”, but is it true? If so, what does it mean to be exist as a  self-aware ego? At this point I have recalled a thought experiment by Avicenna:

 Thought experiment

While he was imprisoned in the castle of Fardajan near Hamadhan, Avicenna wrote his famous “Floating Man” -literally falling man- thought experiment to demonstrate human self-awareness and the substantiality and immateriality of the soul. Avicenna believed his “Floating Man” thought experiment demonstrated that the soul is a substance, and claimed humans cannot doubt their own consciousness, even in a situation that prevents all sensory data input. The thought experiment told its readers to imagine themselves created all at once while suspended in the air, isolated from all sensations, which includes no sensory contact with even their own bodies. He argued that, in this scenario, one would still have self-consciousness. Because it is conceivable that a person, suspended in air while cut off from sense experience, would still be capable of determining his own existence, the thought experiment points to the conclusions that the soul is a perfection, independent of the body, and an immaterial substance. The conceivability of this “Floating Man” indicates that the soul is perceived intellectually, which entails the soul’s separateness from the body. Avicenna referred to the living human intelligence, particularly the active intellect, which he believed to be the hypostasis by which God communicates truth to the human mind and imparts order and intelligibility to nature. Following is an English translation of the argument:

One of us has to consider (yatawaham) that one has been just created in a stroke, and that one has been thus created fully developed and perfectly complete (kāmilan), yet [created] with one’s vision shrouded [or veiled] (hujiba baarahu) from watching [perceiving] (mushāhadāt) external entities created falling [floating] (yahwa) in the air on in empty space (al-khalāʾ) in a fall not buffeted by any felt air that buffets it [i.e. the Person in question]; its limbs separated and not in contact nor touching on another. Then let it contemplate (yataʾamal) whether it would affirm the existence of its own self. It would not then doubt the affirmation that its self is existent (mawjūda), yet not affirming the existence of any other limbs nor inner bowels, nor heart, nor brain, nor anything of the external things. Rather it was affirming the existence of its-self without affirming that it had length, breadth, or depth. And if it were possible for it, in such a state, to imagine (yatakhayal) a hand or any other limb, it would not then imagine it to be part of its-self nor to be condition of it [i.e. its-self existence]. And you know that what is affirmed is distinct from what is not affirmed, and what is implied is distinct from what is not implied. Therefore the nafs [self, soul], whose existence the person has affirmed, is its [the person’s] characteristic identity that is not identical to its body nor its limbs [whose existence] it did not affirm. Therefore, the attentive (al-mutanabih) [to this situation] has a means of realizing (yatanabah) that the affirmation of the existence of its-self (soul, al-nafs) is distinct from the body and something that is quite non-body [i.e. that the mind/soul (al-nafs) is distinct from the body (jism)]; this is known though self-consciousness and if one was distracted from it, one needs to knock one’s baton [as to be alerted to it].

—Ibn Sina, Kitab Al-Shifa, On the Soul.

The original Arabic text reads as follows: يجب أن يتوهم الواحد منا كأنه خلق دفعةً وخلق كاملاً لكنه حجب بصره عن مشاهدة الخارجات وخلق يهوى في هواء أو خلاء هوياً لا يصدمه فيه قوام الهواء صدماً ما يحوج إلى أن يحس وفرق بين أعضائه فلم تتلاق ولم تتماس ثم يتأمل هل أنه يثبت وجود ذاته ولا يشكك في إثباته لذاته موجوداً ولا يثبت مع ذلك طرفاً من أعضائه ولا باطناً من أحشائه ولا قلباً ولا دماغاً ولا شيئاً من الأشياء من خارج بل كان يثبت ذاته ولا يثبت لها طولاً ولا عرضاً ولا عمقاً ولو أنه أمكنه في تلك الحالة أن يتخيل يداً أو عضواً آخر لم يتخيله جزء من ذاته ولا شرطاً في ذاته وأنت تعلم أن المثبت غير الذي لم يثبت والمقربه غير الذي لم يقربه فإذن للذات التي أثبت وجودها خاصية على أنها هو بعينه غير جسمه وأعضائه التي لم تثبت فإذن المثبت له سبيل إلى أن يثبته على وجود النفس شيئاً غير الجسم بل غير جسم وأنه عارف به مستشعر له وإن كان ذاهلاً عنه يحتاج إلى أن يقرع عصاه.

—Ibn Sina, Kitab Al-Shifa, On the Soul

However, Avicenna posited the brain as the place where reason interacts with sensation. Sensation prepares the soul to receive rational concepts from the universal Agent Intellect. The first knowledge of the flying person would be “I am,” affirming his or her essence. That essence could not be the body, obviously, as the flying person has no sensation. Thus, the knowledge that “I am” is the core of a human being: the soul exists and is self-aware. Avicenna thus concluded that the idea of the self is not logically dependent on any physical thing, and that the soul should not be seen in relative terms, but as a primary given, a substance. The body is unnecessary; in relation to it, the soul is its perfection. In itself, the soul is an immaterial substance.

All in all, Soul or Nefs (including ego) is a being pertaining to time not  to space. As Bergson expresses at the very beginning of his “Time and Free Will”:

 

“WE  necessarily  express  ourselves  by  means  of words  and  we  usually  think  in  terms of  space. That is to say, language requires us to establish between  our  ideas  the  same  sharp  and  precise distinctions,  the same discontinuity,  as between material objects.   This assimilation of thought to things is useful in practical life  and  necessary in most of the sciences.   But it may be asked whether the insurmountable difficulties presented by certain – philosophical  problems  do  not  arise  from  our placing side by side in space phenomena  whic do not occupy space, and whether, by merely getting rid of the clumsy symbols round which we are fighting, we might not bring the fight to an end. When an illegitimate translation of the unextended into the extended, of quality into quantity, has introduced contradiction into the very heart of  the question,  contradiction  must, of  course, recur in the answer.”

 

This is a matter of difference between extensional and intensional things. Since  consciousness, free will, qualia and similar matters about mind are intentional matters and ordinary logic pertains to space which is extensional, that is all about res extensa (extended things); then, logic and math are not suitable thinking tools to analize Mind.

 

 

And again, here is a translation of “ayet el kürsi” which describes the absolute consciousness of God comparing it with human consciousness. Here is the translation by J. Arberry:

God

There is no god but He, the

Living, the Everlasting.

Slumber seizes Him not, neither sleep;

To Him belongs

All that is in heavens and the earth.

Who is there that shall intercede with Him

Save by His leave?

He knows what lies before them

And what is after them,

And they comprehend not anything of His knowledge

Save such as He wills.

His Throne comprises the heavens and earth;

The preserving of them oppresses Him not;

He is the All-high, the All-glorious.

 

You can say yahve ya huve or god  or “ah” instead of Allah as the Creatan derviş said once, but if you wish to give a real name which can denote to itself tautologically (remember that  tautological inferences are considered “necessarily true” by logicists) you are forced to repeat Yahve’s own “naming” with all of it’s trascendent implications: “ehyeh asher ehyeh”: ego sum qui sum (I am what I am). Surely, it is  a tautological, namely, ‘necessary and sufficient’ truth which repeats itself without any description. A=A

 

 

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Certainly, as a Jew Spinoza knew by heart what is stated in Genesis as the real identity of God :ego sum qui sum( I am who I am, I am what I am). This is why he made a distinction between thinking mode and extended mod of the same substance as he idendified the absolute substance of the nature as God.

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Ethica HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/index.php?lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e”DB •   Digital and multilingual publication of Spinoza’s Ethics

De Deo (Elwes – en)
index

Definitio 1   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (3)  |  top ^

By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.

Definitio 2   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (3)  |  top ^

A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

Definitio 3   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (10)  |  top ^

By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

Definitio 4   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (7)  |  top ^

By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

Definitio 5   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (10)  |  top ^

By mode, I mean the modifications [“Affectiones”] of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

Definitio 6   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (14)  |  top ^

By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite–that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

explicatio

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr

1, def 6, expl 6e – I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.

Definitio 7   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (5)  |  top ^

That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.

Definitio 8   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (5)  |  top ^

By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.

explicatio

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)

1, def 8, expl 8e – Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.

Axioma 1   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (6)  |  top ^

Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.

Axioma 2   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr  |  top ^

That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself.

Axioma 3   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (2)  |  top ^

From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow.

Axioma 4   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (9)  |  top ^

The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.

Axioma 5   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

Axioma 6   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (6)  |  top ^

A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

Axioma 7   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence.

Propositio 1   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

demonstratio by 1, def 3  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 5

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr

1, prop 1, demo  – This is clear from Def. iii. and v.

1, def 3 – By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

1, def 5 – By mode, I mean the modifications [“Affectiones”] of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

Propositio 2   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (3)  |  top ^

Two substances whose attributes are different have nothing in common.

demonstratio by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 3

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr

1, prop 2, demo  – Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

1, def 3 – By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

Propositio 3   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.

demonstratio by 1, ax 5  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, ax 4

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr

1, prop 3, demo  – If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). Q.E.D.

1, ax 5 – Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

1, ax 4 – The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.

Propositio 4   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

demonstratio by 1, ax 1  |  1, def 3  |  1, def 5  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 4

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr

1, prop 4, demo  – Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else (Ax. i.),–that is (by Def. iii. and v.), nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications. Q.E.D.

1, ax 1 – Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.

1, def 3 – By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

1, def 5 – By mode, I mean the modifications [“Affectiones”] of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

1, def 4 – By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

Propositio 5   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (8)  |  top ^

There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

demonstratio by 1, prop 4  |  1, prop 1  |  1, def 3  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, ax 6

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr

1, prop 5, demo  – If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications–as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.),–it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly (Def. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another,–that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D.

1, prop 4 – Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

1, prop 1 – Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

1, def 3 – By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

1, ax 6 – A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

Propositio 6   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (3)  |  top ^

One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

demonstratio by 1, prop 5  |  1, prop 2  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 3

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Ivantsov – ru | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr

1, prop 6, demo  – It is impossible that there should be in the universe two substances with an identical attribute, i. e., which have anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop. iii.), one cannot be the cause of another, neither can one be produced by the other. Q.E.D.

1, prop 5 – There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

1, prop 2 – Two substances whose attributes are different have nothing in common.

1, prop 3 – Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.

corollarium by 1, ax 1  |  1, def 3  |  1, def 5  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 6

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (2)

1, prop 6, cor  – Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as appears from Ax. i. and Def. iii. and v.). Now (by the last Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external itself. Q. E. D.

1, ax 1 – Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.

1, def 3 – By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

1, def 5 – By mode, I mean the modifications [“Affectiones”] of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

1, prop 6 – One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

aliter by 1, ax 4  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 3

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr

1, prop 6, alit – This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be substance.

1, ax 4 – The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.

1, def 3 – By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

Propositio 7   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (9)  |  top ^

Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

demonstratio by 1, prop 6, cor   |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 1

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr

1, prop 7, demo  – Substance cannot be produced by anything external (Corollary, Prop. vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause–that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to its nature. Q.E.D.

1, prop 6, cor  – Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as appears from Ax. i. and Def. iii. and v.). Now (by the last Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external itself. Q. E. D.

1, def 1 – By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.

Propositio 8   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (4)  |  top ^

Every substance is necessarily infinite.

demonstratio by 1, prop 5  |  1, prop 7  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 2

1, prop 5 – There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

1, prop 7 – Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

1, def 2 – A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

scholium 1 by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 7

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr

1, prop 8, sc 1 – As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance is necessarily infinite.

1, prop 7 – Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

scholium 2 by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 7

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)

1, prop 8, sc 2 – No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstrations of Prop. vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence they attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, make complete confusion–think that trees might talk just as well as men–that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed; and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So, also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind. But, if people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism. For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself–that is, something of which the conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the thing in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas of non-existent modifications; for, although they may have no actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in their existence, because they are conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct–that is, a true–idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if any one affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true–in short, the height of absurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning–that there is but one such substance. I think that this may profitably be done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the demonstration, we must premise:–
1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From this it follows that–
2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it does not imply any fixed number of triangles.
3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause why it should exist.
4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated apart from such definition.
It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less. For example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity’s sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general; we must also show why there are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual. Now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause. And, as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence must necessarily be included in its definition; and from its definition alone existence must be deducible. But from its definition (as we have shown, Notes ii., iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances; therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.

1, prop 7 – Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

Propositio 9   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr  |  top ^

The more reality or being a thing has the greater the number of its attributes.

demonstratio by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 4

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1, prop 9, demo  – This is evident from Def. iv.

1, def 4 – By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

Propositio 10   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (3)  |  top ^

Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

demonstratio by 1, def 4  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 3

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1, prop 10, demo  – An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and, therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.

1, def 4 – By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

1, def 3 – By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

scholium by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 6

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)

1, prop 10, sc  – It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in fact, conceived as distinct–that is, one without the help of the other–yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other; but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is, then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.
If any one now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be sought for in vain.

1, def 6 – By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite–that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

Propositio 11   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (11)  |  top ^

God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

demonstratio by 1, ax 7  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 7

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1, prop 11, demo  – If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

1, ax 7 – If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence.

1, prop 7 – Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

aliter 1 by 1, prop 7  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 2

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1, prop 11, alit 1 – Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence–e.g., if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from existing, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause must either be contained inthe nature of the thing in question, or be external to it. For instance, the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it would involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)
But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order of universal nature in extension. From the latter it must follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. It follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or reason be granted which prevents its existence.
If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very nature of God, or be external to him–that is, drawn from another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence.
As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature, such cause must, perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn from God’s own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect, is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of God; nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

1, prop 7 – Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

aliter 2 by 1, ax 1  |  1, prop 7  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 6

1, ax 1 – Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.

1, prop 7 – Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

1, def 6 – By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite–that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

scholium by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 6

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1, prop 11, sc  – In this last proof, I have purposely shown God’s existence a posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily followed, not because, from the same premises, God’s existence does not follow a priori. For, as the potentiality of existence is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength for existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from external causes. Of such things, they see that those which quickly come to pass–that is, quickly come into existence–quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of accomplishment–that is, not so easily brought into existence–those things which they conceive as more complicated.
However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here show the measure of truth in the proverb, “What comes quickly, goes quickly,” nor discuss whether, from the point of view of universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I need only remark, that I am not here speaking of things, which come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any external cause. Things which are produced by external causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause, and therefore their existence arises solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from their own. Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is nothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection of a thing does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect–that is, of God. For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given. This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive reader.

1, prop 6 – One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Propositio 12   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.

demonstratio by 1, prop 8  |  1, prop 6  |  1, prop 5  |  1, prop 2  |  1, def 4  |  1, prop 10  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 7

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1, prop 12, demo  – The parts into which substance as thus conceived would be divided, either will retain the nature of substance, or they will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self-caused, and (by Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts (by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be absurd. If we adopt the second alternative–namely, that the parts will not retainthe nature of substance–then, if the whole substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is absurd.

1, prop 8 – Every substance is necessarily infinite.

1, prop 6 – One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

1, prop 5 – There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

1, prop 2 – Two substances whose attributes are different have nothing in common.

1, def 4 – By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

1, prop 10 – Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

Propositio 13   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr  |  top ^

Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

demonstratio by 1, prop 5  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 11

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1, prop 13, demo  – If it could be divided, the parts into which it was divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance, or they would not. If the former, we should have several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd. If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also absurd.

1, prop 5 – There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

1, prop 11 – God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

corollarium

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)

1, prop 13, cor  – It follows that no substance, and consequently no extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.

scholium by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 8

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1, prop 13, sc  – The indivisibility of substance may be more easily understood as follows. The nature of substance can only be conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii.) involves a manifest contradiction.

1, prop 8 – Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Propositio 14   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (3)  |  top ^

Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

demonstratio by 1, def 6  |  1, prop 11  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 5

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1, prop 14, demo  – As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any substance besides God were granted it would have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore, besides God no substance can be granted, or consequently, be conceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Q.E.D.

1, def 6 – By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite–that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

1, prop 11 – God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

1, prop 5 – There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

corollarium 1 by 1, def 6  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 10, sc 

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (6)

1, prop 14, cor 1 – Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).

1, def 6 – By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite–that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

1, prop 10, sc  – It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in fact, conceived as distinct–that is, one without the help of the other–yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other; but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is, then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.
If any one now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be sought for in vain.

corollarium 2 by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, ax 1

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1, prop 14, cor 2 – t follows: 2. That extension and thought are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents (affectiones) of the attributes of God.

1, ax 1 – Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.

Propositio 15   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (18)  |  top ^

Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

demonstratio by 1, prop 14  |  1, def 3  |  1, def 5  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, ax 1

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1, prop 15, demo  – Besides God, no substance is granted or can be conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def. v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance; wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only through it be conceived. But substances and modes form the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing can be, or be conceived. Q.E.D.

1, prop 14 – Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

1, def 3 – By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

1, def 5 – By mode, I mean the modifications [“Affectiones”] of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

1, ax 1 – Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.

scholium by 1, prop 6, cor   |  1, prop 8, sc 2  |  1, prop 14  |  1, prop 12  |  1, prop 13, cor   |  1, prop 8  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 5

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)

1, prop 15, sc  – Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile by the other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant; thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi., and Note 2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all start from the following points:–
Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be infinite, or, consequently, that it can appertain to God. This they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or two. If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be conceived to be divided into two parts each part will then be either finite or infinite. If the former, then infinite substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another infinite, which is also absurd.
Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths, it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part measured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve times as great as the other.
Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance apart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the distance between the two lines will be continually increased, until at length it changes from definite to indefinable. As these absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance must necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain to the nature of God.
The second argument is also drawn from God’s.supreme perfection. God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being, cannot be passive; but extended substance, in so far as it is divisible, is passive. It follows, therefore, that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God.
Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto. However, I think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.) to be absurd. Moreover, any one who reflects will see that all these absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts; therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that infinite quantity is not measureable, and cannot be composed of finite parts. This is exactly what we have already proved (in Prop. xii.). Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in reality recoiled upon themselves. If, from this absurdity of theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares, and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to deny that circles have any centre, from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For, taking extended substance, which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible (Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can be multiplied and divided.
So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be infinitely divided. Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface of lines, and a line of points. This must be admitted by all who know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who deny the possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substance could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others remaining joined together as before? And why should all be so fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum? Surely in the case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one can exist without the other, and can remain in its original condition. As then, there does not exist a vacuum in nature (of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to prevent it, it follows from this also that the parts cannot be really distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is substance cannot be divided.
If any one asks me the further question, Why are we naturally so prone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect. If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to all, who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination, especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are distinguished, not really, but modally. For instance, water, in so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is extended substance; from this point of view it is neither separated nor divisible. Further, water, in so far as it is water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.
I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in fact, founded on the same assumption as the first–namely, that matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed of parts. Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God (by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could receive its modifications. All things, I repeat, are in God, and all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly show) from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can in nowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the Divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is granted to be infinite and eternal. But enough of this for the present.

1, prop 6, cor  – Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as appears from Ax. i. and Def. iii. and v.). Now (by the last Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external itself. Q. E. D.

1, prop 8, sc 2 – No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstrations of Prop. vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence they attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, make complete confusion–think that trees might talk just as well as men–that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed; and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So, also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind. But, if people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism. For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself–that is, something of which the conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the thing in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas of non-existent modifications; for, although they may have no actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in their existence, because they are conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct–that is, a true–idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if any one affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true–in short, the height of absurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning–that there is but one such substance. I think that this may profitably be done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the demonstration, we must premise:–
1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From this it follows that–
2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it does not imply any fixed number of triangles.
3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause why it should exist.
4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated apart from such definition.
It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less. For example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity’s sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general; we must also show why there are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual. Now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause. And, as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence must necessarily be included in its definition; and from its definition alone existence must be deducible. But from its definition (as we have shown, Notes ii., iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances; therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.

1, prop 14 – Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

1, prop 12 – No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.

1, prop 13, cor  – It follows that no substance, and consequently no extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.

1, prop 8 – Every substance is necessarily infinite.

1, prop 5 – There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

Propositio 16   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (16)  |  top ^

From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways–that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

demonstratio by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 6

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1, prop 16, demo  – This proposition will be clear to everyone, who remembers that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more reality. Now, as thc divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Q.E.D.

1, def 6 – By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite–that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

corollarium 1

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1, prop 16, cor 1 – Hence it follows, that God is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect.

corollarium 2

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1, prop 16, cor 2 – It also follows that God is a cause in himself, and not through an accident of his nature.

corollarium 3

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1, prop 16, cor 3 – It follows, thirdly, that God is the absolutely first cause.

Propositio 17   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by any one.

demonstratio by 1, prop 16  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 15

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1, prop 17, demo  – We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing, solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved (in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be, nor be conceived; but that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to act. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by any one. Q.E.D.

1, prop 16 – From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways–that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

1, prop 15 – Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

corollarium 1

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1, prop 17, cor 1 – It follows: I. That there can be no cause which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.

corollarium 2 by 1, prop 11  |  1, prop 14, cor 1  |  1, prop 17  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 7

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1, prop 17, cor 2 – It follows: 2. That God is the sole free cause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature (by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole necessity of his nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the sole free cause. Q.E.D.

1, prop 11 – God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

1, prop 17 – God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by any one.

1, def 7 – That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.

scholium by 1, prop 16  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 16, cor 1

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1, prop 17, sc  – Others think that God is a free cause, because he can, as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have said follow from his nature–that is, which are in his power, should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about, that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle, that its three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.
Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God’s nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God’s nature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actually supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe, that he can bring into existence everything which he actually understands, for they think that they would thus destroy God’s power. If, they contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think, would clash with God’s omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to assert that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God’s supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things–that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways, or always follow from the same necessity; in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity. This manner of treating the question attributes to God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For, otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render himself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to establish that God is perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power extends; this seems to be an hypothesis most absurd, and most repugnant to God’s omnipotence.
Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some significations quite different from those they usually bear. For intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God, would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will prove as follows: If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood, inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his casuality (Prop. xvi. Coroll. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is as it is, because it exists by representation as such in the intellect of God; Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute God’s essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence. This seems to have been recognized by those who have asserted, that God’s intellect, God’s will, and God’s power, are one and the same. As, therefore, God’s intellect is the sole cause of things, namely, both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its existence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former.
For example, a man is the cause of another man’s existence, but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and, therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of one of them cease, the existence of the other will not necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also. Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in respect to its existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause of both the essence and the existence of our intellect; therefore the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. The reasoning would be identical, in the case of the will, as any one can easily see.

1, prop 16 – From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways–that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

Propositio 18   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr  |  top ^

God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

demonstratio by 1, prop 15  |  1, prop 16, cor 1  |  1, prop 14  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 3

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1, prop 18, demo  – All things which are, are in God, and must be conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi., Coroll i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him. This is our first point. Further, besides God there can be no substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to God. This is our second point. God, therefore, is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.

1, prop 15 – Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

1, prop 16, cor 1 – Hence it follows, that God is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect.

1, prop 14 – Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

1, def 3 – By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

Propositio 19   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (3)  |  top ^

God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.

demonstratio by 1, def 6  |  1, prop 11  |  1, prop 7  |  1, def 8  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 4

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1, prop 19, demo  – God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.) necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.). Further, by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def. iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance–in other words, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should be involved in the attributes of substance. Now eternity appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the attributes, and thus all are eternal. Q.E.D.

1, def 6 – By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite–that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

1, prop 11 – God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

1, prop 7 – Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

1, def 8 – By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.

1, def 4 – By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

scholium by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 11

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1, prop 19, sc  – This proposition is also evident from the manner in which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God, like his essence, is an eternal truth Further (in Prop. xix. of my “Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy”), I have proved the eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.

1, prop 11 – God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

Propositio 20   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.

demonstratio by 1, prop 19  |  1, def 8  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 4

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1, prop 20, demo  – God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore the same attributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at the same time his eternal existence–in other words, that which constitutes God’s essence constitutes at the same time his existence. Wherefore God’s existence and God’s essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.

1, prop 19 – God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.

1, def 8 – By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.

1, def 4 – By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

corollarium 1

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1, prop 20, cor 1 – Hence it follows that God’s existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.

corollarium 2 by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 20

Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es | Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (3)

1, prop 20, cor 2 – Secondly, it follows that God, and all the attributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be changed in respect to essence–that is, obviously, be changed from true to false, which is absurd.

1, prop 20 – The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.

Propositio 21   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (7)  |  top ^

All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

demonstratio by 1, prop 11  |  1, def 2  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 20, cor 2

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1, prop 21, demo  – Conceive, if it be possible ( supposing the proposition to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God, it is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived as finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite); therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.) must necessarily exist.
We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting, the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed, anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first point.
Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if it can suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be about not to exist.
Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist), thought would perforce have existed without the idea of God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that, thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed therefrom. Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point. Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God’s absolute nature.

1, prop 11 – God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

1, def 2 – A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

1, prop 20, cor 2 – Secondly, it follows that God, and all the attributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be changed in respect to essence–that is, obviously, be changed from true to false, which is absurd.

Propositio 22   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (3)  |  top ^

Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite.

demonstratio by 1, def 2  |  1, prop 11  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 20, cor 2

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1, prop 22, demo  – The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the preceding one.

1, def 2 – A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

1, prop 11 – God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

1, prop 20, cor 2 – Secondly, it follows that God, and all the attributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be changed in respect to essence–that is, obviously, be changed from true to false, which is absurd.

Propositio 23   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.

demonstratio by 1, def 5  |  1, prop 15  |  1, def 8  |  1, def 6  |  1, prop 19  |  1, prop 21  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 22

Propositio 24   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr  |  top ^

The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

demonstratio by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 1

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1, prop 24, demo  – This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that of which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is self-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.

1, def 1 – By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.

corollarium by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 14, cor 1

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1, prop 24, cor  – Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist, or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.

Propositio 25   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (2)  |  top ^

God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.

demonstratio by 1, ax 4  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 15

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1, prop 25, demo  – If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by Ax. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is absurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things. Q.E.D.

1, ax 4 – The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.

1, prop 15 – Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

scholium by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 16

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1, prop 25, sc  – This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi. For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their existence–in a word, God must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This will be made still clearer by the following corollary.

1, prop 16 – From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways–that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

corollarium by 1, prop 15  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 5

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1, prop 25, cor  – Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from Prop. xv. and Def. v.

1, prop 15 – Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

1, def 5 – By mode, I mean the modifications [“Affectiones”] of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

Propositio 26   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (2)  |  top ^

A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act.

demonstratio by 1, prop 25  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 16

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1, prop 26, demo  – That by which things are said to be conditioned to act in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is obvious ); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props. xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point. Our second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown, is absurd.

1, prop 16 – From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways–that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

Propositio 27   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.

demonstratio by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, ax 3

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1, prop 27, demo  – This proposition is evident from the third axiom. Q.E.D.

1, ax 3 – From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow.

Propositio 28   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (8)  |  top ^

Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.

demonstratio by 1, prop 26  |  1, prop 24, cor   |  1, prop 21  |  1, ax 1  |  1, def 3  |  1, def 5  |  1, prop 25, cor   |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 22

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1, prop 28, demo  – Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Coroll.).
But that which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi). It must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i. and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the attributes of God. But from God, or from any of his attributes, in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore it must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are modified by some modification which is finite and has a conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this cause or this modification (for the reason by which we established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and again, this last by another (for the same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity. Q.E.D.

1, prop 26 – A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act.

1, prop 24, cor  – Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist, or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.

1, prop 21 – All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

1, ax 1 – Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.

1, def 3 – By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

1, def 5 – By mode, I mean the modifications [“Affectiones”] of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

1, prop 25, cor  – Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from Prop. xv. and Def. v.

1, prop 22 – Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite.

scholium by 1, prop 15  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 24, cor 

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1, prop 28, sc  – As certain things must be produced immediately by God, namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which, nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it follows: –1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after his kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop. xxiv., Coroll.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect. But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

1, prop 15 – Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

Propositio 29   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (6)  |  top ^

Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

demonstratio by 1, prop 15  |  1, prop 11  |  1, prop 16  |  1, prop 21  |  1, prop 27  |  1, prop 24, cor   |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 26

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1, prop 29, demo  – Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannot be called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists necessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently (Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the divine nature absolutely or whether we consider it as in any way conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only the cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop. xxiv., Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.). If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is impossible, and not contingent that they should render themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing that is contingent. Q.E.D.

1, prop 15 – Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

1, prop 11 – God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

1, prop 16 – From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways–that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

1, prop 21 – All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

1, prop 27 – A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.

1, prop 24, cor  – Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist, or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.

1, prop 26 – A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act.

scholium by 1, prop 14, cor 1  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 17, cor 2

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1, prop 29, sc  – Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura natarans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii.) God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause.
By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.

1, prop 14, cor 1 – Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).

Propositio 30   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else.

demonstratio by 1, ax 6  |  1, prop 14, cor 1  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 15

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1, prop 30, demo  – A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect in representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived. Therefore the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

1, ax 6 – A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

1, prop 15 – Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

Propositio 31   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, etc., should be referred to passive nature and not to active nature.

demonstratio by 1, def 5  |  1, prop 15  |  1, def 6  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 29, sc 

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1, prop 31, demo  – By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from other modes, such as love, desire, etc., and therefore (Def. v.) requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (by Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passive rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of thinking. Q.E.D.

1, prop 15 – Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

1, def 6 – By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite–that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

1, prop 29, sc  – Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura natarans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii.) God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause.
By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.

scholium

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1, prop 31, sc  – I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function, admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality: but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. For we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of the act of understanding.

Propositio 32   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr  |  top ^

Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause.

demonstratio by 1, prop 28  |  1, prop 23  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, def 7

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1, prop 32, demo  – Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist, nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause, and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus, however it be conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def. vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or constrained cause. Q.E.D.

1, prop 28 – Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.

1, prop 23 – Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.

1, def 7 – That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.

corollarium 1

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1, prop 32, cor 1 – Hence it follows, first, that God does not act according to freedom of the will.

corollarium 2 by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 29

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1, prop 32, cor 2 – It follows secondly, that will and intellect stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular manner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner. And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying that motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no more appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner.

1, prop 29 – Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

Propositio 33   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr  |  top ^

Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained.

demonstratio by 1, prop 16  |  1, prop 29  |  1, prop 11  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 14, cor 1

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1, prop 33, demo  – All things necessarily follow from the nature of God (Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix). If things, therefore, could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have been different, God’s nature would also have been able to be different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that different nature also would have perforce existed, and consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods. This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd. Therefore things could not have been brought into being by God in any other manner, etc. Q.E.D.

1, prop 16 – From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways–that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

1, prop 29 – Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

1, prop 11 – God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

scholium 1

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1, prop 33, sc 1 – As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the words necessary and impossible.
A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge.
A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does not involve a contradiction, or of which knowing that it does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes us,–such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or impossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.

scholium 2 by 1, def 7  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 17, sc 

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1, prop 33, sc 2 – It clearly follows from what we have said, that things have been brought into being by God in the highest perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a most perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They assign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory, but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is no need for me to repeat what I said in the note to Prop. xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further, that although it be granted that will appertains to the essence of God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. If it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be convicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never could have decreed anything but what is; that (God did not exist before his decrees, and would not exist without them. But, it is said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in God. But persons who say this must admit that God can change his decrees. For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature and her order, different from those which he has ordained–in other words, if he had willed and conceived something different concerning nature–he would perforce have had a different intellect from that which he has, and also a different will: But if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a different will, without any change in his essence or his perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the decrees which he has made concerning created things, and nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect and will concerning things created and their order are the same, in respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.
Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that God’s intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as they also admit that God’s intellect, and God’s will, and God’s essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a different actual intellect and a different will, his essence would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at first, if things had been brought into being by God in a different way from that which has obtained, God’s intellect and–will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have been different, which is absurd.
As these things could not have been brought into being by God in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he had understood them.
But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the will of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought it about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection, and vice versa. What is such an assertion, but an open declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should understand things differently from the way in which he does understand them? This (as we have just shown) is the height of absurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its employers, as follows: All things depend on the power of God. In order that things should be different from what they are, God’s will would necessarily have to be different. But God’s will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly demonstrated) from God’s perfection. Therefore neither can things be different. I confess that the theory which subjects all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all things with a view of promoting what is good. For these latter persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar, or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only another name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of their existence. I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting such wild theories.

1, prop 17, sc  – Others think that God is a free cause, because he can, as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have said follow from his nature–that is, which are in his power, should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about, that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle, that its three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.
Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God’s nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God’s nature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actually supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe, that he can bring into existence everything which he actually understands, for they think that they would thus destroy God’s power. If, they contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think, would clash with God’s omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to assert that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God’s supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things–that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways, or always follow from the same necessity; in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity. This manner of treating the question attributes to God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For, otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render himself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to establish that God is perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power extends; this seems to be an hypothesis most absurd, and most repugnant to God’s omnipotence.
Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some significations quite different from those they usually bear. For intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God, would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will prove as follows: If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood, inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his casuality (Prop. xvi. Coroll. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is as it is, because it exists by representation as such in the intellect of God; Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute God’s essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence. This seems to have been recognized by those who have asserted, that God’s intellect, God’s will, and God’s power, are one and the same. As, therefore, God’s intellect is the sole cause of things, namely, both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its existence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former.
For example, a man is the cause of another man’s existence, but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and, therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of one of them cease, the existence of the other will not necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also. Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in respect to its existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause of both the essence and the existence of our intellect; therefore the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. The reasoning would be identical, in the case of the will, as any one can easily see.

Propositio 34   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (5)  |  top ^

God’s power is identical with his essence.

demonstratio by 1, prop 11  |  1, prop 16  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 16, cor 1

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1, prop 34, demo  – From the sole necessity of the essence of God it follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.). Wherefore the power of God, by which he and all things are and act, is identical with his essence. Q.E.D.

1, prop 11 – God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

1, prop 16 – From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways–that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

1, prop 16, cor 1 – Hence it follows, that God is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect.

Propositio 35   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists.

demonstratio by  HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 34

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1, prop 35, demo  – Whatsoever is in God’s power, must (by the last Prop.) be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

1, prop 34 – God’s power is identical with his essence.

Propositio 36   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (4)  |  top ^

There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow.

demonstratio by 1, prop 25, cor   |  1, prop 34  |   HYPERLINK “http://www.ethicadb.org/pars.php?parid=1&lanid=3&lg=en&PHPSESSID=82d79f312e4f411105f6c9162bf2961e&ftop=82px”1, prop 16

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1, prop 36, demo  – Whatsoever exists expresses God’s nature or essence in a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is (by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given conditioned manner God’s power, which is the cause of all things, therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow. Q.E.D.

1, prop 25, cor  – Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from Prop. xv. and Def. v.

1, prop 34 – God’s power is identical with his essence.

1, prop 16 – From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways–that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

Appendix   Latin | Appuhn – fr | Stern – de | Peri – it | Suchtelen – nl | Peña – es |Pautrat – fr | Misrahi – fr     infra (1)  |  top ^

In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all things are pre-determined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion offered, taken care to remove the prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.
All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship him). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it ? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows first, that men think themselves free, inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them to wish and desire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event, and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them not a little in their search for what is useful, for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, etc., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware, that they found these conveniences and did not make them they think they have cause for believing, that some other being has made them for their use. As they look upon things as means, they cannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers ( having no information on the subject) in accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honors. Hence also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain, i.e., nothing which is useless to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, and men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result: among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, etc.: so they declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at some wrong done them by men, or at some fault committed in their worship. Experience day by day protested and showed by infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, that God’s judgments far transcend human understanding. Such a doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and properties of figures without regard to their final causes. There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides mathematics, which might have caused men’s minds to be directed to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge of the truth.
I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in view, and that final causes are mere human figments. This, I think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollaries of Prop. xxxii., and, in fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with the utmost perfection. However, I will add a few remarks, in order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly. That which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versa: it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect. Passing over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident, it is plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that that effect, is most perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in that respect, more imperfect. But if those things which were made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.
Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God: for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something which he lacks. Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a distinction between the object of want and the object of assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation. They are unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he desired them.
We must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their theory–namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of exhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a roof on to some one’s head and kills him, they will demonstrate by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man; for, if it had not by God’s will fallen with that object, how could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent circumstances) have all happened together by chance? Perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way. “But why,” they will insist, “was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very time walking that way?” If you again answer, that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will again insist: “But why was the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?” So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at last you take refuge in the will of God–in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance. So, again, when they survey the frame of the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art conclude that it has been fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt another.
Hence any one who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being, and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the interpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that, with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only available means for proving and preserving their authority would vanish also. But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my third point.
After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves, and to account those things the best of all which have the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they were bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that they are free agents arose the further notions praise and blame, sin and merit.
I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human nature; the former I will briefly explain here.
Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God they have called good, everything which hinders these objects they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things and their own nature. When phenomena are of such a kind, that the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say that they are well-ordered; if the contrary, that they are ill-ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to confusion–as though there were any order in nature, except in relation to our imagination–and say that God has created all things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it should be most easily imagined. If this be their theory they would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and very many others which confound its weakness. But enough has been said on this subject. The other abstract notions are nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is differently affected, though they are considered by the ignorant as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that everything was created for the sake of themselves; and, according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion whose objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health, the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or fetid; it through our taste, sweet or bitter, full-flavored or insipid, if through our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc.
Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound, or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic enough to believe that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony–all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather mistakes for things the forms of his imagination. We need no longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed and finally skepticism: for, although human bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another; what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I need not further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well known. It is commonly said: “So many men, so many minds; everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as palates.” All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as mathematics attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I have urged.
We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted.
Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, etc. But these reasoners are, as I have said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men, that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.

 

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natura naturata versus natura naturans

Max Muller, in his lectures, noted the striking similarities between Vedanta and the system of Spinoza, saying “the Brahman, as conceived in the Upanishads and defined by Sankara, is clearly the same as Spinoza’s ‘Substantia’.[107] Helena Blavatsky, a founder of theTheosophical Society also compared Spinoza’s religious thought to Vedanta, writing in an unfinished essay “As to Spinoza’s Deity—natura naturans—conceived in his attributes simply and alone; and the same Deity—as natura naturata or as conceived in the endless series of modifications or correlations, the direct outflowing results from the properties of these attributes, it is the Vedantic Deity pure and simple.”

Spinoza ya tenkitlerim:

  • Geometrik demonstrasyonu ve matematiği şüphe edilemez sanıyordu zira onun çağında farklı GEOMETRİLER YOKTU
  • CEVHER (yani atom) konseptine dayanarak akıl yürütüyor ve elbette o çağda bizim fizik bilgimiz henüz mevcut olmadığı için cevher hakkındaki felsefi mütalaatına çok fazla güveniyordu
  • Sonsuzluk kavramını da çok tereddütsüz kullanıyor. Cantorun set teorisi ve goedelden sonra biz o kadar naive olamıyoruz bu sonsuzluk bahsinde dahi.
  • Aristo mantığının da şüphe edilemez olduğunu düşünüyor elbette…

 

MÜSBET TENKİDİM ise budur ki, bütün bu bilgi eksikliklerine rağmen ruh ve tanrı bahsini descartes gibi dualist olmak yerine tek bir cevherin farklı mode ve attribute ları olarak ele alması: hem panentheist mystic intuionlarla varılan umumi mistik tecrübelerin vardığı neticeler ile ve hem de –ruh ve madde problemini tek bir cevherin iki farklı vechesi olarak gördüğü için- modern ilmi telakkilere aykırı değil. esaslı ve doğru bir çözüm şekli sağlam bir felsefi temel sunuyor. Einstein ve benzeri ilim adamlarının spinozaya hayran olması bu yüzden… Einstein, “Evren’in harikulade düzenlenmiş olduğunu ve belli yasalara uygun hareket ettiğini görüyoruz ama bu yasaları sadece bulanık bir şekilde anlayabiliyoruz.

Spinoza’nın panteizmine hayranım, ama onun modern düşünceye katkısına çok daha fazla hayranım, çünkü o ruh ve bedeni iki ayrı şey değil de bir bütünmüş gibi gören ilk filozoftur. ” der.

Tanrıya inanıyor musunuz?” sorusuna ise, “Var olanların düzenli uyumunda kendini gösteren Spinoza’nın Tanrısı’na inanıyorum,” demiş derler.

neticeten ben dahi, ‘in Spinoza veritas’ diyorum.

“According to the Gospel of Mary, Jesus himself articulates the essence of Nous:

“There where is the nous, lies the treasure.” Then I said to him: “Lord, when someone meets you in a Moment of Vision, is it through the soul [psuchē] that they see, or is it through the spirit [pneuma]?” The Teacher answered: “It is neither through the soul nor the spirit, but the nous between the two which sees the vision…”

— The Gospel of Mary, p. 10

 

Cnsc: Awareness of what is happening?

No simple, agreed-upon definition of consciousness exists. Attempted definitions tend to be tautological (for example, consciousness defined as awareness) or merely descriptive (for example, consciousness described as sensations, thoughts, or feelings

 

Conscious awareness instead of the example of philosophical Zombie give these examples

Of Humanoid japan robots, kara, kocasının robot benzeriyle evlenen kadın filmi, AI ve blade runner filmleri

 

 

Ego sum ego existo, but what does it mean to be an ego and what does it mean to be exist? We all have born into a cultural milieu which our parents belong; we have learned and accepted all the cultural institutions which has been built by a language No-body is in the situation of first man, Adam who once had eaten the fruit of knowledge as described in Genesis. All men including scientists has been brought up as if everybody knows everything and everything already known and described by language, at least there are many things we can know and use and describe by the language institutionalized as we use, we have been born and live in a civilized society. even in a pre-civilized cultural milieu like hunter-gatherer cultures, there is this illusion of knowledge which is indoctrinated to our mind by our parents, by teaching a language. But by learning a language we are learning a hierarchical and already institutionalized knowledge of culture.  We are all deceived by the language we have used that we have some true, necessary and sufficient knowledge of a reality which is described by the language of our ancestors. It is true that language is the archived knowledge of all the life experiences and wisdom of the culture in which we have been brought up. But language indoctrinates our mind also that we have true knowledge. Although sometimes parents get confused by the strange questions a child can easily states and ask, but they also get used not really think about the replies given to those innocent questions. Reality is already described and hierarchically institutionalized by the language which is thought by our parents. But as we learn we are also indoctrinated by many qualifications and beliefs; e.g. “-culture is a good thing”, “-who says so?” “-our parents, so we have to accept and believe it.” Because our parents also believes what they have been thought by the use of language. And What is more, what happens if a child insists to resist to these customary behaviours and indoctrinated beliefs, he is going to be punished by elders. As a result, it seems everybody knows everything which is indoctrinated by the language. But it is a grand illusion, nobody knows “what is reality in fact?” but what is known by everybody is only a particular culture, some cultural achievements experienced and learned in the past by the particular society and described in a particular language. Even scientists could accept as true all the descriptions of the world by a particular language and use the words of that language to understand and describe their scientific knowledge. Not all the conceptions of scientific language and methods could be like mathematical measurements, everybody is forced to conceive reality from the filter of a particular language. Furthermore, I think they are usually wrong, though everybody get used and lived comfortably in this grand illusion.

 

Even a scientist could be easily deceived by the language, since not every scientists is also going to be a semanticist and think about the meaning of linguistic tools. In fact most of the intellectuals have no idea about semantics, they accept and internalize their native language as a given fact and adopt it as a natural tool to understand reality. Let us not forget that a scientist is only a scientific specialist who tries to know more and more about less and less significant details of a branch of knowledge. Nowadays nobody can embrace the whole bulk of the tree of knowledge, it has grown too much to be embraced wholly, a scientific specialist is an intellectual  who can know only one or a few branch of the tree of knowledge. A scientific specialist could not be a great, really erudite, scholar like al-Biruni of middle ages; it is not possible any more. Ordinarily nobody always thinks about his ego, his consciousness or mind body problems, and surely not any scientist is going to explore them if he is not a specialist of that field. Why a mathematician or historian should also be a specialist of neurophysiology, or say, semanticist? So then, everybody accepts the content of his consciousness and his native language as a natural phenomenon and never has any doubt about them.

 

I have an ego, I exist; and natural world of things outside me and my body which are sensed with my conscious Mind and described with my native language are also exist. This is the way we ordinarily think about the reality of existence. This is the nature of human consciousness and everybody accept them naturally. What if, as a philosopher, if I doubt all of them and interrogate them from the perspective of related disciplines and sciences whether they are naturally given facts of reality or not? For instance what is an “ego” or consciousness from the perspective of the related specialists of neurophysiology? What does it mean to be exist from the perspective of a physicist? For example how many kind of existence we can experience or imagine?

 

e.g., Novum organum idols

 

I think Philosophers, and scientists have given too much credit to the consciousness of these sense impulsions. The mind’s eye, its consciousness and its sensory experience of course gives us a picture of reality. Ordinary human experience, or human consciousness can sense and describe a material world according to its natural human abilities: And humanity as a homo sapience have this empirical observational experience of this material world which is readily sensible, perceivable and seemingly conceivable, so that, in day to day life, human consciousnes imagines and lives in a materialistic picture of world. It was the common human experience since homo sapience has begun his adventure some two hundred thousand years ago until very recent times. Modern Science is about some three hundred years old only.  The theory of Quantum Mechanics belongs to 20th century. We cannot know the origins for sure, there are always unknown or unrecorded beginnings of every accomplishment of humanity; so we do not know historically how old language is, but logic has been framed by Aristotle only two thousand years ago. That means our consciousness and conceptions of language are nearly as old as humanity and formed and developed in history in accordance with ordinary human experience before the arrival of all the complicated scientific instruments of experience which can measure and describe a very different reality, namely, we live in the middle world and  our senses and linguistic tools of comprehension is developed  in accord with this reality, but with these complicated scientific instruments we can now make some experiences of a quantum mechanical micro-world, this world is unreachable by human sensory organs and experience: and its mechanical principles are different from usual Newtonian mechanics of that older world, it’s language and logic also different from our everyday world. There is also that astronomically large world of macro-cosmos which remained out of reach of human abilities and comprehension for thousands of centuries, yet this world is also now regarded in the realm of scientific investigations thanks to the ability of informing new instruments of technology.

As a result we have to change at least some parts of our old habitual worldview. Believing our sensory organs we have thought that ‘we see the world as it is’ since the dawn of humanity. And indoctrinated by the language of a particular culture one belongs, we have assumed that language is capable of expressing everything; it is enough to be careful about its usage and logic then you can correctly express yourself. Habitually we get used to our native language and as if blinded by the light we have been slaves of our own conscious awareness of the reality though we dream often.  Let us remember the saying: “Habit is the opium of imagination” We have to be relieved from our old habit of  adhering strongly to a wrong materialistic  picture of the world as it was comprehended by human consciousness in accordance to its limited sensory organs. We should carefully and semantically analyse every indoctrinated concept of our native language which habitually makes every person a puppet of his own culture. I do not think that the simple logic and mathematical constructions guarantees the truth value of every statement.

That means we have to interrogate nearly whole human nature and ability. We should not deceive ourselves with this limited construction of reality as pictured by human mind. We should be careful about every intensional predicates of the propositions of logic. We have learned in 20th century that even mathematics cannot be thoroughly consistent.

Sometimes Physicists express strange ideas about the micro-world of quantum mechanics. Everybody heard something about Shroedinger’s cat which means that the result of an experience on the tiny world of subatomic particles might change because of the effect of observation. I will try to illustrate my viewpoint about consciousness of human-mind with a similar thought experience and moreover, I will use a simile from our everyday experience since human consciousness also can conceive only those events which happens in this ordinary  middle world of everyday life. Most of us has experienced this curious behaviour of the stupid cockroach when you pay attention and noticed that a dirty cockroach runs in your bathroom it instantly stops moving hoping to be overlooked. How the stupid creature knows instantly whenever you have seen its movements only god knows, but I suppose you have that simple experience with the cockroach. Naturally here is a window and a mirror on the wall of the room. Imagine that sun arises slowly from the horizon and some emergent light rays coming into the room from the windows falls upon the mirror on the wall  and reflected upon some shady side of the floor illuminates that part of the floor and enables you to see the hidden movements of that cockroach; and the damned thing instantly stops; instinctively feeling, God knows how, that its movement has been observed by somebody. That is your observation affects its movement/ action and it instantly stops like dead body. They say some subatomic particles behaves exactly like that damned cockroach when we try to observe them because of the effect of that observation. You can go on to make some more similes like particle wave duality etc. but the reason I have constructed this animated metaphor is to illustrate my perspective about the relations of Ego and consciousness of human Mind with the external forces of nature which surrounds and affect that ego and its mind and body. The sun arises on the events horizon and spreads its lights naturally. And some of its light rays reaches to the window of house and goes inside the house. Now then, our body is the house of our ego, and the eyes are the windows of that house. And you may accept that the mirror on the wall is similar to the conscious awareness of that ego (or soul) while rays fall upon it temporarily; and we can go on to use this allegory in such a way that the reflected rays coming from the window and illuminating the floor is also similar to the minds act of conceiving through reflections of abstract conceptions and at last the rays of nature meets with real life as the instinctive feelings and act of the cockroach.

HYPERLINK “http://www.sahinucar.com.tr/sahin-ucar/about-my-philosophy/ego-sum-qui-sum-guidemap/”per speculum videmus in aenigmate; et ex parte cognoscimus, et ex parte prophetamus. imagine that  the light rays are coming not from the sun but the moon in a dark night. Being dark and the light beams of moon is also weaker,  in this conditions  we should barely see it in/per a  dark speculum and hardly notice on the floor -with the help of the reflected rays- that something is supposedly we could not discern: what is moving, whether it is a cockroach or some other kind of animal left in the riddle we could only guess.  if you do not see a cockroach at that particular instant on that point, this does not prove that there is or there is not any cockroach in a different location of that room. But if you see once at that instant, it is proved already that there has been at least one C.. etc. So we are going to know from a partial knowledge and we are going to prophetize that there must be some more in that occasion again inferring from a partial knowledge.

I think it is a useful simile which illustrates what I mean by saying that I have to begin with “ego” as the standpoint of my perspective since the standpoint determines perspective and perspective in turn determines orientation. Surely what I mean by “perspective” is that it is the consciousness of the existence. Orientation also means, ‘to comprehend the situation’. One can go on to make more similes about the life of an ego, a personality; in short, if this quest for meaning throughout time begins with a guide-map of this unknown territory of this existence which is hoped to be discovered by us, we have to choose a good standpoint at first, to look at the terra incognita with a useful perspective.

That is Descartes was right, knowledge naturally begins from the self-awareness of a mind. Ego sum qui sum: I am what I am. Semantically the predicate of this proposition refers to itself though intentionally, but there is no emotional or subjective qualification at the predicate of this proposition, so this means, we are not using an invalid intensional logic here, although it seems tautological since “it says only what it is”.  This proposition “I am what I am” seems like an undeniable deductive fact. It also reminds me Heidegger’s statement that “existence is what it is.”

Then there can be no real definition of the real essence of “esse (being) except its own semantically self-reflexive name.  The famous statement of the Bishop Berkeley “esse est percipi”: ‘to be’ means ‘to be perceived’ (by a mind) might be true in this sense that whatever the perceived essence is, it is perceived by itself, by its own mind. What I am trying to describe is the nature of relations between ego (self, soul), mind, consciousness and the perceived and consciously felt effects of the nature which surrounds that ego.

 

 

 

 

Physicists believe that there is only sensible material substances and they exists in a space-time framework of nature. That’s it. Then what about light? It is sensible, but is it material? But let me say here at once that I think there are many different kinds and levels of existence. For example, consciousness might be related with brain tissues but exists only in time. Language also is a metaphysical substance which exists in time not in space. Mathematics is also a first class metaphysical entity which exists outside of space and time. Ego is a metaphysical existence which come into existence in time though it also owns and includes a body which pertains to space also. Let me reiterate that a scientific specialist cannot embrace every branch and whole bulk of the tree of knowledge, but a philosopher of history should take into account every possible perspective of science. So he should carefully interrogate what neuro-physiology or cognitive scientists and other related specialists say about, ego, mind, consciousness etc. because of epistemological reasons at first and to interpret the meaning of existence secondly. This is why Descartes formulated the famous dictum “cogito ergo sum” to be relieved from the doubt about the reality of existence. And this is why I have begun with the phrase “ego sum qui sum”.

So we have to investigate what does it mean the word “ego” and sum (to be exist) from all the perspectives of the cognitive sciences, neurophysiology, philosophy of mind etc. and also from the perspective of semantics too, since  I think this word of “ego” (I, me-ness) Is the first and ultimate foundation of semantics also. Materialism believes only one kind of substance, that is, the nature of the existence means to be a material substance which exists in space-time. Owing to their traditions of old atomic theories and scientific methods, Physicists also believe that there should be physical evidence about things to be accepted as “existed”,  so it must have a material substance. So sometimes they go as far as to say that “The passage of Time” is an illusion, although they speak about the space-time framework of events. Surely, they are not meant to be semanticists; they try to comprehend reality. Nevertheless they are forced to make some semantical analyses of the terms used in physics, in the framework of their scientific methods, let me say according to their tastes and standards. Then what? When they try to understand and describe reality in some mathematical measurements and mathematically constructed formulas as a useful model of reality, they are not aware that, naturally all of these mathematical models are going to be pure metaphysics; they are building a scientific metaphysics to describe physics. I think scientists have very naive notions about the semantics of language, logic and mathematics. Philosophers also have no better position from this viewpoint.  Our ego and consciousness are surely inherent in our nature, but our native language is also internalized in such a degree that we do not pay scrutinized attention what we think , and what we say and whether our dictum correspondences to that thought or not. I invite contemporary physicists to remember what they say about natural forces. They exist in time only (not in space-time) they are “the causes” which their affects becomes spatial material substances and appears (happens) as events in space time. Think about gravity, it’s affect as an example of the action at a distance without material relatedness of the masses, it is a physical force but is it a material substance? You can describe gravity and the degree of its attractive affects with a mathematical formula which itself is a good example of metaphysical construction though it is a scientific concept. But be aware, I have to inform you that, from a semantical perspective, every conception is forced to be a metaphysical construction, a metaphysically abstracted, idealized and generalized forms of individual perceptions. What about the photons of light? Is it a material particle or a wave of energy:  entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitate. You believe if something is sensible or measurable then it really exist. But you cannot measure the time itself.  If we are not conscious, that is not aware of something, does it mean that there and then exist nothing? Though something is not co-existent in time synchronically in space particularly in this present-time, it does not follow that it will not come into existence in future. Though because of strong and weak forces, because of quantum mechanics, Physicists are all get used to inhabit logical paradoxes in their curriculum of scientific experiments and theory, yet they display a strong adherence to logic. Maybe everybody is not aware of this fact, but I think every predicate of logic and mathematics also need to be scrutinized by a careful analyses of semantics.

Neither consciousness which is framed out of limited sense impulsions, nor the concepts of any language (including logic and math) can fully grasp and describe the whole reality of existence.  Natural forces and particularly material or sensible things affects our sensory organs and make some perceivable Sense impulsions. And making their way through the tissues of brain neurons, a consciousness network of electrical discharges comes into existence in a fluently continuous timing in a conscious brain. That is the state of consciousness which is highly dependent of the transferred sense impulsions  brain tissues. Then let us consider the light impulsions. Human eye can detect only white light which is a very limited kind of radiation frequency comparing all the frequencies of light, e.g., short and long wave frequency lights, x-rays, beta, gamma-rays etc. Semantically and from the perspective of ordinary language which expresses human experience since two hundred thousand years until very recent times, there was only white light which could be sensible by the retina of human eye. Surely we can detect and measure other light frequencies. Then it means, we have very limited sensation capability about light. We can touch and sense material objects, we can hear sounds etc. These sensations make the content of our consciousness about this natural world of material objects which we are sure , we have sensed and aware of them. So the ego tries to comprehend all of  the content of this consciousness and knows that these sensed and comprehended things are all different and alien objects from the comprehending subjective mind (of the ego) itself. the mind is aware of both his inner life and external world. and it constructs consciously  a general view of the outer world by the use of construction of some conceptions; from whatever it conceives. They are all inferred from the highly limited sense impulsions and constructed by the Mind.

That is our consciousness can give us a very limited view of reality through very limited range of capability of our sensory organs. But the human mind is not only conceives and comprehends the content of its conscious states it also has a high creative imagination indeed. We should not forget that the reality of the outer world is a creation of mind based on the inferred conceptions from sensible perceptions. Sense impressions might be limited and somewhat faulty and rude impressions of reality but with the use of measurement science can transform them to objective statements as far as possible. Surely we have a science of nature as Physics which uses a mathematical language, but nevertheless we should not forget that this science is also limited to empirical experiences which in turn depends ultimately to the capability of human consciousness.

Novum organum idols

I think it is a useful simile which illustrates what I mean by saying that I have to begin with “ego” as the standpoint of my perspective since the standpoint determines perspective and perspective in turn determines orientation. Surely what I mean perspective is the consciousness of the existence and orientation means to comprehend the situation. One can go on to make more similes about the life of an ego, a personality; in short, if this quest for meaning throughout time begins with a guide-map of the unknown territory of this existence which is hoped to be discovered by us we have to choose a good standpoint at first to look at the terra incognita with a useful perspective.

That is Descartes was right, knowledge naturally begins from self-awareness of a mind. Ego sum qui sum: I am what I am. Semantically the predicate of this proposition refers to itself though intentionally, but there is no emotional or subjective qualification at the pre dicate of this proposition, so this means, we are not using an invalid intensional logic here, though it seems tautological since “it says only what it is”.  This proposition “I am what I am” seems like an undeniable deductive fact. It also reminds me Heidegger’s statement that “existence is what it is.”

Then there can be no real definition of the real essence of “esse (being) except its own semantically self-reflexive name.  The famous statement of the Bishop Berkeley “esse est percipi”: to be means to be perceived (by a mind) might be true in this sense that whatever the perceived essence is, it is perceived by itself, by its own mind. What I am trying to describe is the nature of relations between ego (self, soul), mind, consciousness and the perceived and consciously felt effects of the nature which surrounds that ego.

Ego sum qui sum: My ego is the house of existence, Ego existo. I perceive whatever exists inside me or outside of myself as the external forces of nature. If so, then the true knowledge should begin with this self-knowledge. As beautifully stated by Yunus Emre “ilim ilim bilmektir/ ilim kendin bilmektir/sen kendüyü bilmezsin/bu nice okumaktır” But the Scientist ignores the consciousness and prefers to investigate the natural world which lies as an external and alien world to the self. Knowing that the Mind cannot be easily measured and comprehended by reductionist scientific methods science is settled to accept the verification of any fact about this external world is provided and guaranteed by the affirmation of the same results by different colleges who can test the same events and objectivity of affirmation is also provided in such a way that science should take into account only measurable aspects of reality. You can measure only things extended in space, (there is no real time measurement,,,, you can measure with time… measurement itself happens in time) that is, material objects, as a result scientific method tends to be materialistic. One is forced to use introspective (therefore subjective) method to explore the events of consciousness. The so called behaviourist Psychology preferred (because of the scientific orientation and preference of objectively measurable aspects of human Psyche) and investigated the mind  judging from the external behaviours of a person and as if, inferring from these behavioural facts some objective knowledge about the state of his consciousness.  Naturally these investigations of appearing behaviours meant to be resulted all about unimportant trifle aspects of the human mind. From the scientific perspective it seemed a useless, fruitless and hopeless case to investigate mind. This is why science ignored consciousness until 70thies of 20th century. But with the help of new and extra-ordinary scientific instruments like MRI, it is made easy to see what happens inside the human brain while it was alive and working; and as a result serious scientific curiosity aroused about Mind and consciousness. It was only natural that science ignored consciousness studies for so long since it was unreachable by scientific methods, There was no instrument which can show and measure brain events. But with the emergence of these extraordinary instruments attention turned to brain and consciousness studies. Now everybody is made aware that this was the most important frontier of human knowledge though very difficult to understand because of the high complexity of brain and consciousness. Yet I have to reiterate that the epistemology of human knowledge should naturally begin from this standpoint of self-ness and from this perspective of conscious awareness of reality.

 

 

 

 

. cognition, volition, valuation

Bak: Saul kripke, naming and necessity

Ve  dainton Phenomenal self

 

 

 

 

 

 

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

Ego sum :“me-ness”

http://www.theassc.org/files/assc/2336.pdf

 

Dr. Francis Crick, beyni anlayabilmek için görme kabiliyeti üzerinde 50 senedir çalıştığını söylüyordu. Ölmeden önceki son eseri olan, “Astonishing Hypothesis” (Şaşırtıcı Hipotez) kitabında, yalnızca beynin  faaliyetlerinin ceman yekun (holistik) bir sonucu olarak, dış dünyanın bir görüntüsü gibi bir şuuru oluşturmakla beraber ve ayni zamanda kendi şuurunun farkında olmak şeklindeki,  “düşündüğünün, hissettiğinin ve  kendi mevcudiyetinin bile farkında olan bir benlik” duygusunun veya şuurunun nöronlar Arası iletişimin teşkil ettiği bir network sayesinde oluşabileceğini ve bunun nörofizyolojik münasebetler ile tasvir edilebileceğini’ iddia ediyordu İngiliz  biyolog (professor of biology and director of the Brain and Behavior Research Group at The Open University in the United Kingdom) Steven Rose  diyor ki: “Bence, şu andaki büyük problemimiz şu ki,  farklı ilim şubelerinden çok  farklı seviyelerde çok fazla bilgi akışı var.Molekuler biyoloji, genetik, biyokimya, fizyoloji, hücre fizyolojisi ve bütün sistemin fizyolojisine dair çalışmaları inceliyoruz- ve  positron emisyonu tomografisi, fMRI( fonksiyonel magnetk resonans imajı) veya benim kullandığım Magnetoencephaografi  (MEG) gibi beynin iç yapısına açılan bütün bu hayranlık uyandırıcı fevkalade pencerelerden gelen imajlar… Sonra tabii,  suni networkler ile (artificial networks)uğraşanlar ve diğerleri gibi teorisyenler var. Yani mesele pek çok yaklaşım tarzı ile ele alınıyor. Problem şu ki, bütün bu farklı yaklaşımlar arasındaki farklı seviyeleri hangi köprülerle birbirine bağlayacağımızı bilmiyoruz, yani bu nerdeyse kör adamlarla filin hikayesine benziyor- insanlar beynin nasıl çalıştığına dair çok küçük parçaları kavrıyorlar, fakat bu parçaların hepsini birleştirmeye muvaffak olamıyoruz. Bu sıralarda, Beyin Çağı’ndan -1990’lar- sonraki bu çağda (decade), acilen ve çok muhtâc olduğumuz bir şey varsa, o da daha fazla Beyin teorisi. Resimleme (imaging) ile molekuler seviye arasında gidebileceğimiz bir yol bulmaya ihtiyacımız var.”

Mesela Bertrand Russell, Analysis of Mind kitabında, zihnî (mental) dünya ile, objektif maddî dünyanın tefrîk edilmesini bile tenkid ediyor. Beş duyu vasıtasıyla algıladığımız dış dünyaya mahsus, “bu katı objektif madde” idrakinin (perception) dahi zihnimizin mantıkî bir inşası (logical construction) olduğunu söylüyor. Russell, ‘maddî dünyayı da zihnî dünyayı da inkâr etmediğini; ancak her ikisinin de bizim idrâk ettiğimizden daha primitive gerçeklikler olduğunu; gerek ‘şuur’ gerek “katı madde” hakkındaki idrâkimizin dahi, bu primitive aslî muhtevâlara göre, “soyutlanarak inşa edilmiş tasavvurlar” olduğunu’ söylüyor. Pekala, şimdilik kabul edelim ki bütün şuur hallerimiz, beynimizdeki nörofizyolojik faaliyetlerin –duyu organlarından gelen münferid verileri (sense datum) işleyerek ve inşa ederek holistik (bütünleştirici) bir tarzda tasvir ettiği- bir tasavvurdan ibaret olsun. Ne de olsa beynin dış dünya ile teması ancak duyu organlarımızın ilettiği bir takım “nöroşimik impulse”lardan (elektriki ve kimyevi veriler) ibaret. Bu durumda, bu verilerin de beyindeki nörofizyolojik faaliyetler sonucunda işlenerek inşa edilen bir tasavvur olması elbette kaçınılmaz.

Ancak biz dışımızdaki maddi nesneleri, doğrudan doğruya   temas ederek değil, bunlara dair duyu organlarının ilettiği verileri işleyen beynimizin inşa ettiği bir tasavvur olarak görüyoruz elbette. Ama akleden bir benlik yoksa, bir nesneyi gören beynin bir tek hücresi olmadığına göre ve herhangi bir imaj pek çok beyin hücresi arasında bir ağ şebekesi halinde dağılmış olduğuna göre, herhangi bir nesneyi gören bu beynin bu hücreleri veya maddi yapısı veya neocortex dahi değil ise, onda sayısız nöronlar arasında yayılmış bir şebeke/network olarak teşekkül eden bu şuuru/tasavvuru kim idrak ediyor?

Zira, Eğer benliği beynin faaliyetlerinden ibaret ve onun bir emergent mahsulü sayarsak, beynin faaliyetleri sonucunda teşekkül eden tasavvuru idrak eden, beynimizde teşekkül eden görüntü tasavvurunun varlığını fark eden ve o görüntüyü gören çağdaş nörofizyolojideki tabir ile bir ‘homunculus’un ( beyindeki görüntüyü gören küçük adamın)  daha varlığını farz etmemiz gerekecek. Çağdaş ilme göre şuur ve benlik bahsini tartışırken böyle bir homunculus farz etmek, hatta onun da arkasında başka bir benlik ve ilahiri homunculuslar şeklindeki, benliğin nasıl olup ta kendi şuurunun farkında olabildiği problemi ile ilerde yüzleşeceğiz. Beyinde şu anda mevcut olan bir şuur hali -ayni anda- bizzat kendisinin objesi olamaz. (No subjective state who is at present, could be its own object at the same time). Kendisini algılayan bir algı, kendini gören göz gibi, bizzat kendine referans veren bir şuur olur bu çünkü. Bu ancak olsa olsa hatırlama vasıtasıyla bir müddet sonra oluşan bir şuur olabilir. Biz işte bu şuurun, tasavvurun, ne gördüğümüzün de farkındayız ve bunu farkedenin ise benlik şuurumuz olduğunu biliyoruz

Acaba Benlik şuuru yalnızca beynin nöroşimik faaliyetleri ile ve her nasılsa oluşan holistik bir benlik tasavvuru neticesinde mi ortaya çıkıyor? Benliği yalnızca beynin faaliyeti diye anlayabilir miyiz? Nefsin ancak beynin nörofizyolojik faaliyetleri sayesinde kendi dışındaki dünyayı tasavvur  ettiği ve şuurun dahi bu beynin faaliyetine bağlı olduğu âşikar. Lakin nesneleri gören gözümüz değil, hatta beynimiz de değil, beyindeki bir takım prosesler şeklinde oluşan bir şuur. Velhasıl bu kendi kendisine  referans vererek anlaşılmaz hâle gelen, şuur, benlik ve beyin münasebetleri, felsefî muhakemeye veya reductionist (indirgemeci) ilmi metodolojiye indirgenemeyecek kadar kompleks görünüyor. Benlik Meselesi, ne eski felsefecilerin yaptığı gibi, beyin hakkında hiç bir ciddî bilgiye sahib olmadan, sadece mantık yürüterek ve ne de çağdaş ulemanın materialist ve reductionist (aşırı detaylara indirgemeci) tecrübi usulleri ile izah edilebilecek kadar basit değil. Reductionism (parçalara indirgemek ve tek tek parçaların/ detayların moleküler -hatta atomik seviyede- fonksiyonlarını anlamaya çalışmak) ise, zaten terkibî ve bütünleyici olan Holistik usulün tam zıt kutbunda yer alan bir usuldür. Hatta ilerde yeri gelince, bu bahsin geniş metafizik  şerhler gerektiren marifet-i nefs yönünü dahi göreceğimizi söylemiştik, ki o da bir bahs-i diger.

 

Zaten self referans şeklindeki hükümler mantıki paradokslara yolaçan bir şeydir.

Mamafih,  benlik bahsi o kadar geniş şümulü olan bir bahis ki, bütün felsefi problemleri, identity, unity, plurality, individual/singular- universal, causality, space, time vs gibi bütün metafizik meselelerini yeniden ele almayı gerektirecek çapta dahi tartışılabilir: mesela Dainton’un yazdığı “Phenomenal Self” kitabı gibi.////////////////////////////////////////////////////

 

Just what is “time”? Spengler declared that no one should be allowed to ask. The physicist Richard Feynman (1988) answered, “Don’t even ask me. It’s just too hard to think about.” Empirically as much as in theory, the laboratory is powerless to reveal the flow of time, since no instrument exists that can register its passage. But why do we have such a strong sense that time does pass, ineluctably and in one particular direction, if it really doesn’t? Why does this “illusion” have such a hold over us?

“All awareness,” wrote the poet Denise Levertov (1974), “is an awareness of time,”

Time past and time future Allow but a little consciousness. To be conscious is not to be in time.

 

Zamanın identity sembol inşası dil ve rakamlarla münasebeti

Perspective implies an intention

Intentio tua grata et accepta apud creatorem sed opera tua non sunt illi accepta

intendere arcum in/ intendere anima in

///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

 

 

 

What I am trying to show here, is beatifully expressed by mevlana:
kâşki hesti zebani daşti/ ta zi hestan perdeha ber daşti
her çi guyi ey demi hesti ez an/ perde-i diger ber u best bedan…”
Keşke varoluşun zebanı(dili) olsaydı da var olanların üzerindeki perdeyi kaldırsaydı”
şu anda hakikate dair her ne söylenirse söylensin bil ki o söz de hakikatin üstüne çekilen bir diğer perde olup onu bizden gizleyecektir.

 

 

 

 

  • Identity problem: Hüviyet, Mahiyet, Nefs: the problem of identity in semantics, logic math., science and metaphysics

Semantical identity and naming,  logic, math philosophy, identity of ego as name

 

 

Descriptions of the words : Identity, one, unity, plurality

i·den·ti·ty [ī déntətee]

(plural i·den·ti·ties)

noun

1. what identifies somebody or something: the name or essential character that identifies somebody or something
2. essential self: the set of characteristics that somebody recognizes as belonging uniquely to himself or herself and constituting his or her individual personality for life
3. sameness: the fact or condition of being the same or exactly alike
4. mathematics equation true for all its variables: a mathematical equation that remains valid whatever values are taken by its variables
5. mathematics Same as identity element

[Late 16th century. < late Latin identitas < ident-, combining form of Latin idem “same” < id “that”]

i·den·ti·fy [ī dénti f]

 

i·den·ti·cal [ī déntik’l]

adjective

1. alike in every way: exactly the same as or equal to something else, or alike in every respect

  wearing identical dresses

  His name was identical to mine.

2. developed as twins from same egg: describes twins of the same sex and with the same genetic makeup that have developed from a single fertilized egg

-i·den·ti·cal·ly, adverb
-i·den·ti·cal·ness, noun

 

(past and past participle i·den·ti·fied, present participle i·den·ti·fy·ing, 3rd person present singular i·den·ti·fies)

transitive verb

1. recognize and name: to recognize somebody or something and to be able to say who or what he, she, or it is
2. consider as same: to consider two or more things as being entirely or essentially the same

[Mid-17th century. Directly or via French identifier < medieval Latin identificare “make the same” < ident- (see identity)]
-i·den·ti·fi·a·bil·i·ty [ī dènti fī ə bíllətee], noun
-i·den·ti·fi·a·ble [ī dénti f əb’l], adjective
-i·den·ti·fi·a·bly, adverb

identify with
intransitive verb

1. feel affinity with: to feel a strong sympathetic or imaginative bond with somebody or something and a sense of understanding and sharing his, her, or its nature or concerns
2. associate one thing with another: to consider somebody or something as closely linked with somebody or something such as a school of thought or political movement (often passive)

 

identity crisis
(plural i·den·ti·ty cri·ses)

 

noun

1. anxiety about social role: a period during which somebody feels great anxiety and uncertainty about his or her identity and role in life and society, typically experienced in adolescence or middle age
2. anxiety of group: a period of anxiety or confusion about the nature, aims, and role of a group, organization, or business
Watch again the Story of one

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RSpadYjnYl8

one
one [wun]

unit unum essence of the universe

(plural ones) CORE MEANING: a grammatical word indicating a single thing or unit, and not two or more

  adjective just one accident out of thousands

  adjective a one-legged man

  pronoun Central Newark, once home to several bank branches, now has one.

  pronoun Bill got one of his boxing gloves off.

1. adjective, pronoun

unique: used to indicate the only thing or person with a specific characteristic

  the one exception to this

2. adjective, pronoun

used to distinguish something: distinct from others of its kind

  from one thought to the next

3. adjective

at nonspecific time: relating to an unspecified time in the past or future

  one August afternoon

4. adjective

used for emphasis: used instead of “a” and “an” to emphasize a following adjective or expression (informal)

  He’s one cool customer!

5. adjective

particular: introducing the name of somebody who is not known to the speaker

  a letter from one Thomas Atherton of Southport

6. pronoun

typical individual: used to refer to people in general (formal)

  One can eat well here.

7. pronoun

somebody or something unspecified: used to indicate somebody or something not specifically identified (dated)

  the voice of one crying in the wilderness

8. pronoun

previously mentioned: used instead of a preceding noun to indicate somebody or something already mentioned

  nothing but an old vase, and a cracked one at that

9. pronoun

joke or story: used to refer to a question, joke, or remark

  That’s a good one!

10. noun

1: the number 1. It is the smallest whole number, designating a single unit, and the first cardinal number.

11. noun

something with value of 1: something in a numbered series with a value of one

  to throw a one

12. noun

U.S. dollar bill: a one-dollar bill (informal)

13. noun

time measure: used to indicate the time as one hour after twelve midday or midnight

  We’ll stop for lunch at one.

14. noun

music musical notation: the numeral 1 used as the bottom figure in a time signature to indicate that the beat is measured in whole notes

[ Old English ān < Indo-European]

all one not important enough to be of any consequence to somebody

  It’s all one to me.

 

Unity versus plurality

Particular versus universal

Singular/ individual versus general and whole

.

in semantics

 Naming and Necessity. S. Kripke ve   dainton Phenomenal self

Do proper names have senses? Frege argues that they must have senses, for, he asks, how else can identity statements be other than trivially analytic? How, he asks, can a statement of the form a = b, if true, differ in cognitive value from a = a? His answer is that though ‘a’ and ‘b’ have the same reference they have or may have different senses, in which case the statement is true, though not analytically so. But this solution seems more appropriate where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are both non-synonymous definite descriptions, or where one is a definite description and one is a proper name, than where both are proper names. Consider, for example, statements made with the following sentences:

(a) ‘Tully = Tully’ is analytic.

But is

(b) ‘Tully = Cicero’ synthetic?

If so, then each name must have a different sense, which seems at first sight most implausible, for we do not ordinarily think of proper names as having a sense at all in the way that predicates do; we do not, e.g. give definitions of proper names. But of course (b) gives us information not conveyed by (a). But is this information about words? The statement is not about words.

 

Self is like unicorn semantically

What descriptions are you willing to substitute for the name (self)NN

Semantical meaning as stated naming and necessity and intensional predicates

Here comes the problem of consistency and logic also since time is paradoxical

Philosophical & Metaphysical meaning as a being in time dimension only

Physicalist definition and scientific meaning of identity

 

We can now resolve our paradox: does a proper name have a sense? If this asks whether or not proper names are used to describe or specify characteristics of objects, the answer is ‘no’. But if it asks whether or not proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer, the answer is ‘yes, in a loose sort of way’. (This shows in part the poverty of a rigid sense-reference, denotation-connotation approach to problems in the theory of meaning.)

 

name and identity extensionalism, intetentionalism and intensional logic

.) A context is
extensional when it is one in which the following principles of inference apply
(where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are singular terms):
Substitution of co-referring terms
From ‘… a …’ and ‘a = b’ infer ‘… b …’
(For example: from ‘Vladimir is taller than George Orwell’ and ‘George
Orwell = Eric Blair’ infer ‘Vladimir is taller than Eric Blair’.)..
The origins of the concepts of intentionality and intension
The term ‘intentionality’ has a long and complex history, not all of which is
relevant to our concerns in this book. But a glance at the origins of this
somewhat unusual term will help illuminate its utility.
The Scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages were interested in the
logical structure of concepts. The term ‘intentio’ was employed as a technical

 

Page 17

term for a concept or notion.

 

 

We will not go far wrong if we think of an intentio as a concept. But it is

useful to distinguish two senses of the word ‘concept’. In the logical sense a

concept is thought of as an abstraction, an abstract entity. Concepts in the

logical sense are what logical relations hold between. In the psychological

sense, a concept is a component of a state of mind. (I don’t mean to imply that

this was a distinction which was clearly drawn in the Middle Ages; it is one

which we can draw now, looking back.) Many Scholastic philosophers were

very interested in concepts in the logical sense; as they conceived it, in the

abstract relations between intentiones or intentions. First intentions were con-

cepts which applied to particular objects, whereas second intentions were

concepts which applied to first intentions. Some Scholastic philosophers

thought that second intentions were the subject-matter of logic.

Others, notably St Thomas Aquinas, were interested in concepts in (what

we can now call) the psychological sense. Aquinas developed Aristotle’s theory

of sense-perception, according to which the mind takes on the ‘form’ of the

perceived object, into an account of thinking in general. Aquinas’s view was

that what makes your thought of a goat a thought of a goat was the very same

thing that makes a goat a goat: namely, the occurrence of the form of a goat.

But the form of goat is instantiated in your mind in a different way from the

way it is instantiated in an actual goat: in an actual goat, the form has esse

naturale (natural existence), while in the thought of a goat, the form has esse

intentionale (intentional existence)

 

In Leviathan,

Hobbes scathingly dismissed the idea that the concept of intentionality is

needed to give an account of the beginnings of language:

and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as [Adam] had

found use for, though not so copious, as an orator or philosopher had need of. For I

do not find anything in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all figures, numbers, measures, colours, sounds, fancies, relations; much less the names of words and speech, such as general, specialaffirmativenegativeinterrogativeoptativeinfinitive, all of which are useful; and least of all, of entityintentionalityquiddity, and other insignificant words of the school.

Logic, however, survived the demise of the terminology of intentionality; but

logicians also introduced some terminology which is strikingly similar to that

terminology, so similar that it might be confused with it. In the seventeenth-

century Logic: or The Art of Thinking (the ‘Port Royal Logic’) a distinction was

made between the extension and the comprehension of a term. The extension

of a term is the set or class of things to which the term applies—we can think

of it as the set of things over which the term ‘extends’. So the extension of the

term ‘marsupial’ is the set of all marsupials: kangaroos, wallabies, wombats,

and so on. The comprehension of a term is, as the label suggests, what is

understood by someone who grasps it. Thus the comprehension of the term

‘marsupial’ may be something like creature that suckles its young and keeps

newborns in a pouch.

Leibniz made use of this distinction, but introduced the term ‘intension’ as

a variant of ‘comprehension’, thus providing an elegant counterpart for the

term ‘extension’:

When I say Every man is an animal I mean that all the men are included amongst all the animals; but at the same time I mean that the idea of animal is included in the idea of man. ‘Animal’ comprises more individuals than ‘man’ does, but ‘man’ comprises more ideas or more attributes: one has more instances, the other more degrees of reality; one has the greater extension, the other the greater intension.14

Leibniz puts the point vividly: the more is in the extension, the less is in the

intension, and vice versa. In other words, the more general a term is—the

larger its extension, or the set of things to which it applies—the less specific

 

MIND

11

the intension has to be; and the more specific the intension, the smaller the

extension.

The contrast made here between intension and extension survived into

twentieth-century logic, although it is not formulated in the way Leibniz did.

These days the terms ‘intensional’ and ‘extensional’ are normally applied to

languages (or contexts within a language), or to the logics which study these

languages or contexts. (The following brief exposition will not be news to

those familiar with philosophy of language, and may be skipped.) A context is

extensional when it is one in which the following principles of inference apply

(where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are singular terms):

Substitution of co-referring terms

From ‘… a …’ and ‘a = b’ infer ‘… b …’

(For example: from ‘Vladimir is taller than George Orwell’ and ‘George

Orwell = Eric Blair’ infer ‘Vladimir is taller than Eric Blair’.)

Existential generalization

From ‘… a …’, infer ‘∃x… …’

(For example: from ‘George Orwell is shorter than Vladimir’ infer ‘There is

someone who is shorter than Vladimir’.)

An intensional context is one where one or both of these principles is not

generally valid or truth-preserving. For example: the sentence ‘Dorothy

believes that Vladimir is taller than George Orwell’ is an intensional context,

since together with ‘George Orwell = Eric Blair’ it does not entail ‘Dorothy

believes that Vladimir is taller than Eric Blair’. The first two sentences could

be true while the third is false (if Dorothy does not believe that George

Orwell = Eric Blair). Intuitively, the way to understand the distinction is to see

extensional contexts as those where truth or falsehood depends solely on the

extensions of the expressions involved (hence the above principles), and

intensional contexts as those where truth or falsehood depends on the way the

extensions are conceived.

Frege’s famous theory of sense and reference is an attempt to account for

the logical and semantic properties of certain intensional contexts. Frege dis-

tinguished the reference of an expression, what it refers to, from its sense,

the ‘mode of presentation’ of the reference. In our example, the same refer-

ence (the man, Orwell) is presented in two ways, by the sense associated with

the expression ‘George Orwell’, and by the sense associated with the expres-

sion ‘Eric Blair’. Now, since Frege’s discussion in ‘On sense and reference’,

such psychological contexts have been at the focus of many discussions of

 

Page 20

MIND

12

intensionality. But it is important to emphasize that contexts other than psy-

chological contexts are intensional. (For example, the inference from ‘the

number of coins in my pocket is five’ and ‘five is necessarily odd’ to ‘the

number of coins in my pocket is necessarily odd’ is invalid, because ‘…

necessarily …’ creates an intensional context.) The general feature of inten-

sional contexts is that their logical properties (e.g. whether they allow the

validity of inferences) are sensitive to the ways in which things are described

(e.g., picked out as ‘George Orwell’ or as ‘five’). Insofar as the truth of sen-

tences, and their logical properties, are determined only by the extensions of

the expressions in question, then logic does not need to take account of

the way in which the extensions are picked out, the intensions of these expres-

sions. Logics which attempt to display the logical properties of intensional

contexts are called intensional logics.

When the terminology of intentionality was reintroduced by Brentano in

his 1879 book Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, there was no mention

of intension and extension. Brentano’s concern in this book was to distinguish

the newly emerging science of psychology from physiology on the one hand,

and philosophy on the other. He made this distinction not in terms of the

different methods of these disciplines, but in terms of their different subject-

matters. The subject-matter of physiology was the body, while the subject-

matter of philosophy included questions such as the immortality of the soul,

and so on. Psychology’s subject-matter, by contrast, was mental phenomena,

and the difference between mental phenomena and physical phenomena was

that mental phenomena exhibited ‘what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages’

called ‘the intentional inexistence’ of an object.15

Mental phenomena are intentional, they have objects. So the link with the Scholastic idea of esse intentionale is made explicitly.

But Brentano did not characterize intentionality in terms of the intension-

ality of psychological contexts. It is somewhat mysterious, then, that when

R. M. Chisholm introduced Brentano’s ideas to English-speaking philosophy

in the 1950s, he defined intentionality in terms of criteria of intensionality.16

And when Quine, in his Word and Object (1960), talked about Brentano’s thesis

of the ‘irreducibility of the intentional’, he was talking about the irreducibility

of intensional language to extensional language, not Brentano’s claim that men-

tal phenomena are irreducibly intentional.17 And as we saw above, the ideas of

intentionality and intensionality are distinct, and have distinct origins.

This conflation of the distinct ideas of intentionality and intensionality is

perhaps more understandable given Quine’s method of ‘semantic ascent’,

which asks us to investigate phenomena by investigating the language we use

to speak about phenomena. But nonetheless, the conflation has given rise to

nothing but confusion, and we need to be absolutely clear about this at the

beginning of our enquiry. For it is plain, despite what Chisholm says, that

 

Page 21

MIND

 

intensionality cannot be a criterion or sufficient condition of the presence of

intentionality. Regardless of whether intentionality is the mark of the mental,

there are intensional contexts which are nothing to do with intentionality

 

.

////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

 

 

 

Of all the mysteries of nature, none is greater than that of human consciousness.

 

 

in logic logical atomism (“all propositions are TRUTH-FUNCTIONS OF elementary propositions, in other words that atomic propositions, which are singular, affirmative, and categorical and consist of logically proper names of simple entities together with an attributive or relational predicate, directly Picture their verifying facts,  while non atomic propositions conceal them)X  russsell doubted this reducibility eg.,intensional propositions about beliefs.  (logical positivists call them  protocol or basic propositios and saw them as direct, non inferential reports of experience rather than as pictures of facts.) the earlier suspicion of metaphysics hardened into pricipled hostility by viena circle

 

 

“Identity”, Conundrums of Time & Fuzzy Logic: Degrees of Truth
By Graham Priest

“…Time is involved in various other conundrums, one kind of which we will look at in this chapter. This kind concerns problems that arise when things change; and specifically, the question of what is to be said about the identity of objects that change through time.

“Here is an example. We all think that objects can survive through change. For example, when I paint a cupboard, although its colour may change, it is still the same cupboard. Or when you change your hair style, or if you are unfortunate enough to lose a limb, you are still you. But how can anything survive change? After all, when you change your hairstyle, the person that results is different, not the same at all. And if the person is different, it is a different person; so the old you has gone out of existence. In exactly the same way, it may be argued, no object persists through any change whatsoever. For any change means that the old object goes out of existence, and is replaced by a quite different object.

“Arguments like this appear at various places in the history of philosophy, but it would be generally agreed by logicians, now, that they are mistaken, and rest on a simple ambiguity. We must distinguish between an object and its properties. When we say that you, with a different hairstyle, are different, we are saying that you have different properties. It does not follow that you are literally a different person, in the way that I am a different person from you.

“One reason why one may fail to distinguish between being a certain object and having certain properties is that, in English, the verb ‘to be’ and its various grammatical forms – ‘is’, ‘am’, and so on – can be used to express both of these things. (And the same goes for similar words in other languages.) If we say ‘The table is red’, ‘Your hair is now short’, and similar things, we are attributing a property to an object. But if someone says ‘I am Graham Priest’, ‘The person who won the race is the same person who won it last year’, and so on, then they are identifying an object in a certain way. That is, they are stating its identity.

“Logicians call the first use of ‘is’ the ‘is’ of predication; they call the second use of ‘is’ the ‘is’ of identity. And because these have somewhat different properties, they write them in different ways. The ‘is’ of predication . ‘John is red’ is typically written in the form jR… The ‘is’ of identity is written with =, familiar from school mathematics. Thus, ‘John is the person who won the race’ is written: j = w. (The name w is a description here; but this is of no significance in the present matter.) Sentences like this are called identities.

“What properties does identity have? First, it is a relation. A relation is something that relates two objects….Now, identity is a very special relation. It is a relation that every object bears to itself and to nothing else.” (1)

“…And here, time comes back into the issue. To explain what the problem is, it will be useful to employ the tense operators of the last chapter, and specifically, G (‘it is always going to be the case that’). Let x be anything you like, a tree, a person; and consider the statement x = x. This says that x has the property of being identical to x – which is obviously true: it’s part of the very meaning of identity. And this is so, regardless of time….

“…What the inference shows is that if x is identical to y, and x has the property of being identical to x at all future times, so does y. And since the second premise is true, as we have just noted, it follows that if two things are identical, they will always be identical.

“And what of that? Simply, it doesn’t always seem to be true….” (2)

“While we are on the subject of identity, here is another problem about it. Everything wears out in time. Sometimes, parts get replaced. Motor bikes and cars get new clutches; houses get new roofs; and even the individual cells in people’s bodies are replaced over time. Changes like this do not affect the identity of the object in question. When I replace the clutch on my bike, it remains the same bike. Now suppose that over a period of a few years, I replace every part of the bike, Black Thunder. Being a careful fellow, I keep all the old parts. When everything has been replaced, I put all the old parts back together to recreate the original bike. But I started off with Black Thunder; and changing one part on a bike does not affect its identity: it is still the same bike. So at each replacement, the machine is still Black Thunder; until, at the end, it is – Black Thunder. But we know that that can’t be right. Black Thunder now stands next to it in the garage.

“Here is another example of the same problem. A person who is 5 years old is a (biological) child. If someone is a child, they are still a child one second later. In which case, they are still a child one second after that, and one second after that, and one second after that, … So after 630,720,000 seconds, they are still a child. But then they are 25 years old!

“…These are some of the most annoying paradoxes in logic. They arise when the predicate employed (‘is Black Thunder’, ‘is a child’) is vague, in a certain sense; that is, when its applicability is tolerant with respect to very small changes: if it applies to an object, then a very small change in the object will not alter this fact. Virtually all of the predicates that we employ in normal discourse are vague in this sense: ‘is red’, ‘is awake’, ‘is happy’, ‘is drunk’…” (3)

“So what are we to say? Here is one answer, which is sometimes called fuzzy logic. Being a child seems to fade out, gradually, just as being a (biological) adult seems to fade in gradually. It seems natural to suppose that the truth value of ‘Jack is a child’ also fades from true to false. Truth, then, comes by degrees. Suppose we measure these degrees by numbers between 1 and 0, 1 being complete truth, 0 complete falsity. Every situation, then, assigns each basic sentence such a number.

“What about sentences containing operators like negation and conjunction? As Jack gets older, the truth value of ‘Jack is a child’ goes down. The truth value of ‘Jack is not a child’ would seem to go up correspondingly. This suggests that the truth value of ⌐a [i.e., not a, Y.O.] is 1 minus the truth value of a. Suppose we write the truth value of a as │a│; then we have:

│⌐a│ = 1 – │a│

[i.e., “│…│” the number which is the truth value of, Y.O.]

“Here is a table of some sample values: [See the table below, Y.O.]

“What about the truth value of conjunctions? A conjunction can only be as good as its worst bit. So it’s natural to suppose that the truth value of o & b is the minimum (lesser) of │a │ and │ b │:

“│a & b│ = Min(│a│.│b│)” (4)

[e.g., if │a│is 0.25 and │b│is 0.75, │a & b│will be 0.25, Y.O.]

“What of validity? An inference is valid if the conclusion holds in every situation where the premisses hold. But what is it now for something to hold in a situation? When it is true enough. But how true is true enough? That will just depend on the context. For example, ‘is a new bike’ is a vague predicate. If you go to a bike dealer who tells you that a certain bike is new, you expect it never to have been used before. That is, you expect ‘This is a new bike’ to have value 1. Suppose, on the other hand, that you go to a bike rally, and are asked to pick out the new bikes. You will pick out the bikes that are less than a year or so old. In other words, your criterion for what is acceptable as a new bike is more lax. ‘This is a new bike’ need have value only, say, 0.9 or greater.

“So we suppose that there is some level of acceptability, fixed by the context. This will be a number somewhere between 0 and 1 – maybe 1 itself in extreme cases. Let us write this number as ε. Then an inference is valid for that context just if the conclusion has a value at least as great as £ in every situation where the premisses all have values at least as great as ε.” (5)

“…Maybe because we confuse complete truth with near-complete truth. A failure to draw the distinction doesn’t make much difference normally. But if you do it again, and again, and again, … it does.

“That’s one diagnosis of the problem. But with vagueness, nothing is straightforward. What was the problem about saying that ‘Jack is a child’ is simply true, until a particular point in time, when it becomes simply false? Just that there seems to be no such point. Any place one chooses to draw the line is completely arbitrary; it can be, at best, a matter of convention. But now, at what point in Jack’s growing up does he cease to be 100% a child: that is, at what point does ‘Jack is a child’ change from having the value of exactly 1, to a value below 1? Any place one chooses to draw this line would seem to be just as arbitrary as before. (This is sometimes called the problem of higher-order vagueness.)…” (6)

———-
(1). Graham Priest, “Logic: A Brief Insight” (New York and London: Sterling, 2010), pp. 83-85.
(2). Ibid., pp. 88-90.
(3). Ibid., pp. 93-94.
(4). Ibid., pp. 96-97.
(5). Ibid., pp. 99.
(6). Ibid., 102.

 

in math., : e.g. associative law  ax(bxc) = (axb)xc any function of two arguments which satisfies a similar identity is said to be associative, f.(g.h) (x) =f(g(h(x)))) = (f.g).h(x)) the law is taken as an axiom for many mathematical structures like groups… also in commutative law a+b = b+a axb=bxa  exception is exponentiation 2 üzeri üç 3 üzeri 2 ye eşit değil…  multiplication of quaternion s( a generalization of comlex numbers :their multiplications are not commutative= ve matricelerde de olmaz. Identity, in mathematics, a number or operation that leaves others unchanged when combined with them. Zero is the identity for addition; one is the identity for multiplication. For example:

7 + 0 = 7

7 × 1 = 7

math., coincidental identical,

 

And metaphysics Identity as a philosophical question

 

in nature: Empiricism and verification, confirmation, correspondence to the reality/ identity of facts

Sense impulses beware us about the existence of natural forces. we perceive physical facts and we comprehend them by the use of abstract concepts. Then begins those strange language games, with special symbols of semantical; logical and mathematical signs. We live in a symbolic world called, sometimes as consciousness… They seem to belong to an external world which is outside of our body, different and alien to our selfhood. But what are these alien forces, and how are we going to identify those forces with anything, with any identifiable cause which affects us so and so.

Identity of a thing, thing-in-itself, unity and plurality, unity and essence, discrete and continuum

 

Ego sum ego existo, but what does it mean to be an ego and what does it mean to be exist? We all have born into a cultural milieu which our parents belong; we have learned and accepted all the cultural institutions which has been built by a language No-body is in the situation of first man, Adam who once had eaten the fruit of knowledge as described in Genesis. All men including scientists has been brought up as if everybody knows everything and everything is already known and described by language, at least there are many things we can know and use and describe by the language institutionalized as we use, we have been born and live in a civilized society. even in a pre-civilized cultural milieu like hunter-gatherer cultures, there is this illusion of knowledge which is indoctrinated to our mind by our parents, by teaching a language. But by learning a language we are learning a hierarchical and already institutionalized knowledge of culture.  We are all deceived by the language we have used that we have some true, necessary and sufficient knowledge of a reality which is described by the language of our ancestors. It is true that language is the archived knowledge of all the life experiences and wisdom of the culture in which we have been brought up. But language indoctrinates our mind also that they are true though sometimes parents get confused by the strange questions a child can easily states and ask, but they also get used not really think about the replies given to those innocent questions. Reality is already described and hierarchically institutionalized by the language which is thought by our parents. But as we learn we are also indoctrinated by many qualifications and beliefs; e.g. “-culture is a good thing”, “-who says so?” “-our parents, so we have to accept and believe it.” Because our parents also believes what they have been thought by the use of language. And What is more, what happens if a child insists to resists to these customary behaviours and indoctrinated beliefs, he is going to be punished by elders. As a result, it seems everybody knows everything which is indoctrinated by the language. But it is a grand illusion, nobody knows “what is reality in fact?” but what is known by everybody is only a particular culture, some cultural achievements experienced and learned in the past by the particular society and described in a particular language. Even scientists could accept as true all the descriptions of the world by a particular language and use the words of that language to understand and describe their scientific knowledge. Not all the conceptions of scientific language and methods could be like mathematical measurements, everybody is forced to conceive reality from the filter of a particular language. Furthermore, I think they are usually wrong, though everybody get used and lived comfortably in this grand illusion.

 

Even a scientist could be easily deceived by the language, since not every scientists is also going to be a semanticist and think about the meaning of linguistic tools. In fact most of the intellectuals have no idea about semantics, they accept and internalize their native language as a given fact and adopt it as a natural tool to understand reality. Let us not forget that a scientist is only a scientific specialist who tries to know more and more about less and less significant detail of a branch of knowledge, nowadays nobody can embrace the whole bulk of the tree of knowledge, it has grown too much to be embraced wholly, a scientific specialist is an intellectual  who can know only one or a few branch of the tree of knowledge, a scientific specialist could not be a great, really erudite, scholar like al-Biruni of middle ages; it is not possible any more. Ordinarily nobody always thinks about his ego, his consciousness or mind body problems, and surely not any scientist is going to explore them if he is not a specialist of that field. Why a mathematician or historian should also be a specialist of neurophysiology, or say, semanticist? So then, everybody accepts the content of his consciousness and his native language as a natural phenomenon and never has any doubt about them.

I have an ego, I exist and natural world of things outside me and my body which are sensed with my conscious Mind and described with my native language are also exist. This is the way we ordinarily think about the reality of existence. This is the nature of human consciousness and everybody accept them naturally. What if, as a philosopher, if I doubt all of them and interrogate them from the perspective of related disciplines and sciences whether they are naturally given facts of reality or not? For instance what is an “ego” or consciousness from the perspective of the related specialists like neurophysiology? What does it mean to be exist from the perspective of a physicist? For example how many kind of existence we can experience or imagine?

 

Physicists believe that there is only sensible material substances and they exists in a space-time framework of nature. That’s it. Then what about light? It is sensible, but is it material? But let me say here at once that I think there are many different kinds and levels of existence. For example, consciousness might be related with brain tissues but exists in time. Language also is a metaphysical substance which exists in time not in space. Mathematics is also a first class metaphysical entity which exists outside of space and time. Ego is a metaphysical existence which come into existence in time though it also includes a body which pertains to space also. Let me reiterate that a scientific specialist cannot embrace every branch and whole bulk of the tree of knowledge, but a philosopher of history should take into account every possible perspective of science. So he should carefully interrogate what neuro-physiology or cognitive scientists and other related specialists say about, ego, mind, consciousness etc. because of epistemological reasons at first and to interpret the meaning of existence secondly. This is why Descartes formulated the famous dictum “cogito ergo sum” to be relieved from the doubt about the reality of existence. And this is why I have begun with the phrase “ego sum qui sum”.

So we have to investigate what does it mean the word “ego” and sum (to be exist) from all the perspectives of the cognitive sciences, neurophysiology, philosophy of mind etc. and also from the perspective of semantics also since  I think that word of “ego” (I, me-ness) Is the first and ultimate foundation of semantics also. Materialism believes only one kind of substance, that is, the nature of the existence means to be a material substance which exists in space-time. Owing to their traditions of old atomic theories and scientific methods, Physicists also believe that there should be physical evidence about things to be accepted as “existed” so it must be material substance. So sometimes they go as far as to say that “The passage of Time” is an illusion though they speak about the space-time framework of events. Surely, they are not meant to be semanticists; they try to comprehend reality although they are forced to make some semantical analyses of the terms  used in physics, in the framework of their scientific methods, let me say according to their tastes and standards. Then what? When they try to understand and describe reality in some mathematical measurements and mathematically constructed formulas as the modelling of reality, they are not aware that all of these mathematical models are going to be pure metaphysics, they are building a scientific metaphysics to describe physics. I think scientists have very naive notions about the semantics of language logic and mathematics. Philosophers also have no better position from this viewpoint.  Our ego and consciousness are naturally inherent but our native language is also internalized in such a degree that we do not pay scrutinized attention what we think  is and what we say. I invite contemporary physicists to remember what they say about natural forces. They exist in time only (not in space-time) they are “the causes” which their affects becomes spatial material substances and appears (happens) as events in space time. Think about gravity, it’s affect as the action at a distance without material relatedness of the masses, is it material substance? You can describe gravity and the degree of its attractive affects with a mathematical formula which itself is a good example of metaphysical construction though it is a scientific concept. But be aware, I have to inform you that, from a semantical perspective, every conception is forced to be a metaphysical construction, a metaphysically abstracted, idealized and generalized forms of individual perceptions. What about the photons of light? Is it a material particle or a wave of energy:  entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitate. You believe if something is sensible or measurable then it really exist. But you cannot measure the time itself.  If we are not conscious, that is not aware of something, does it mean that there and then exist nothing? Though something is not co-existent in time synchronically in space particularly in this present-time, it does not follow that it will not come into existence in future. Though because of strong and weak forces, because of quantum mechanics, Physicists are all get used to inhabit logical paradoxes in their curriculum of scientific experiments and theory, yet they display a strong adherence to logic. Maybe everybody is not aware of this fact, but I think every predicate of logic and mathematics also need a scrutinized analyses of semantics.

Neither consciousness which is framed out of limited sense impulsions, nor the concepts of any language (including logic and math) can fully grasp and describe whole reality of existence.  Natural forces particularly material or sensible things affects our sensory organs and make some perceivable Sense impulsions and making their way through the tissues of brain neurons a consciousness network electrical discharges comes into existence in a fluently continuous timing conscious state. That is the state of consciousness which is highly dependent of the transferred sense impulsions. Then let us consider the light impulsions. Human eye can detect only white light which is a very limited kind of radiation frequency comparing all the frequencies of light, e.g short and long wave frequency lights, x-rays, beta, gamma-rays etc. Semantically from the perspective of ordinary language which expresses human experience since two hundred thousand years  and until very recent times there was only white light which could be sensible by the retina of human eye. Surely we can detect and measure other light frequencies then we have very limited sensation capability about light. We can touch and sense material objects, we can hear sounds etc. so the content of our consciousness about this natural world of material objects we have sensed and aware of them. So the ego tries to comprehend all of  the content of this consciousness and knows that these sensed and comprehended things are all different and alien objects of from the comprehending subjective mind (of the ego) itself. the mind is aware of both his inner life and external world and it constructs consciously  a general view of the outer world by the use of construction of some conceptions; whatever it conceives which are all inferred from the highly limited sense impulsions and constructed by it

That is our consciousness can give us a very limited view of reality through very limited range of capability of sensory organs. But the human mind is not only conceives and comprehends the content of its conscious states it also has a high creative imagination indeed. We should not forget that the reality of the outer world is a creation of mind based on the inferred conceptions from sensible perceptions. Sense impressions might be limited and somewhat faulty and rude impressions of reality but with the use of measurement science can transform them to objective statements as far as possible. Surely we have a science of nature as Physic which uses a mathematical language, but nevertheless we should not forget that this science is also limited to empirical experiences which in turn depends ultimately to the capability of human consciousness.

 

 

Sümbül efendi and theseus

 

 

Mahiyet hüviyet arayışı

Var olan ve hissedilen benliği ve hissedilen yabancı varlığın mahiyetini anlama gayreti derinleşince kaÇINILMAZ OLARAK METAFİZİKE VARIYOR

Identity crisis in psychology in brain mind duality (they are identical according to physicalism)

and in Physics: a-tomos and subatomic particles

 

Event and processes: different kind of existence Being in Time and being in space or being in space-time Being in mind(imagination creatrix, dream, historical construction of past and memory) being in instincts, intuition and feelings (dna,character and disposition)

 

 

 

intentional ve intensional, sextus empiricus

 

Kavram uzayı/İDRAK uzayı/ fizik ve rölativite uzayı/ mutlak uzay ve /determizm ve mekan y.koç/ varlığın anlamı/quantum uzayı

4 çeşit te Zaman

Zaman mekan madde ışık sebeplilik :şuur ve ruh zamanı ve sebepliliği telkin eder idrak dokunma ve görme,ve ışık maddeyi denge duygusu yereçekimini particular, universal, identity

subatomik alemde madde:

 Maddi elektronlar ve diğer parçacıkların gayri maddi ışınlara fotonlara ve ışınların da maddeye inkilab etmesi

Makrokozmos da zaman ve mekanın izafileşmesi

Bildiğimiz alem orta alem insan ölçülerinde. idrak donanımımız da öyle. dil de o idrak ölçeğinde gelişmiş yani idrakimiz şuurumuz ve tabii diller insan ölçeğinde bir sağduyuyu dile getiriyor, ilim empirist materyalist  ve pragmatist ama mikro kozmos ve makrokosmos açısından bildiğimiz ve anladığımız herşeyin yanlış olduğunu söylüyor. Sadece insan ölçeğinde geçerli düşüncelerimiz, bu ölçeğe göre gelişmiş düşüncelerin aslı esası yok, zira sadece bu pratik ölçek içinde alelade günlük hayatta işe yarıyor

 

ŞUURUN KENDİ cnt. DEVAMLLIĞI VE DİSCREET ALGILAR

 

Excerpts from…..on the soul

identity : physicalism

ego as an identity of selfness and individuum

identity of existence, individual substances

what is the true nature or identity of existence? Is it fire or water, air  and earth? Is it a complexion made of from individual atoms?

 First person ontology

Perception and conception individuality and complex wholes

See the quest for meaning throughout time: videmus per speculum in aenigmate

 The mirror of mind is also a dark speculum which sees through abstract constructions of theorizing perceives individuum through abstract concepts

. entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, ockham

Different levels of consciousness: lifeless matters as atoms, plants, animals, man, metaphysical C . as nur’us semavat

Self in the light of relativity, Iqbal, Dar 398

Bak: cavidname, Iqbal

 Upanişadlar atman: ego, soul &brahme maya, hakiki panteizm, panentheism and transcendentalism

Mevlana cemadattan öldüm nebat oldum.. hayvan insan melekut

Self identity: Self conception, self consciousness, self according to phsicalism, absolute self

Kavram benliği/idrak benliği/phsycalist benlik/mutlak benlik

mutlak benlik mutlak şuur, true self, false self, self-ness (nefs-kalb-akıl-ruh) :

Knowledge and belief: Philosophy, Science,art,history,religious belief,mystical experience, and philosophy of history. I am making my  judgements as a philosopher of history: i.e., conspectively

Ego in lifeless matter it is the self identity which holds together strongly and keeps itself permanent e.g.a gold atom

Cami gibi cansız binaların bile kimliği var :mesela blue mosque

 

Humanity use all of these perspectives to comprehend or  at least to construct a framework trying to understand the nature of reality. The  quest for the truth or the meaning of existence has two aspects, one side is about the subjective nature of Mind itself and its comprehension tools and the other side is about the external objective world which is everyhting else in contradistinction to the mind. Science assumes what the mind perceives and comprehends about sensible external world is certainly real and could be objectively articulated as far as sensible and measurable so that it coud be checked and verified by other minds.

You can not understand and judge about soul/ mind or the self identity of man by using the thinking tools of philosophy and science

Because of the nature of reasoning tools and scientific perspective you can really know only material world and make some semantical musings about  facts, but  you can not understand even the sensible world without eliminating time factor.

Because of its methodology Science can comprehend only the sensible and measurable things. According to science insensible things do not exists really, they are considered as metaphysical entitities such as math. But thinking tools and assumptions of science are indeed highly metaphsical and often depends on a naive metaphysic of naterialism

You hav to believe that you and analien  external world free from  your mind exists

It can be known

It is understandable: it can be describeable,explainable and prospective

Causality

Determinism

Measurement

Coherence and consitency by affirmation

Testable özemreden

Tekabüliyet ozemre377-78

 

If something experiences, it has a sense of consciousness, or it appears to. In a philosophical way, all I know is I, Me. I can’t prove anything else is really here. I just experience my experience. I assume that you experience yours, but do I really know?? Is it all a trick of mind??? Everything that we use our senses for is absolutely true?

the “scientific method” which is based upon the fallacy of “affirmation of the consequent”. The scientific method depends on   observations i.e. what is sensed or perceived and checked and verified by the measurements and affirmations of the like-minded colleges. It is true if verified by affirmation of other perceiving minds. But there are many metaphysical assumptions which makes possible to construct often mathematical models of reality which underlies all scientific comprehensions of external world. Science assumes that it can ignore the nature of the mind if it can sense something that means there is a sensible real material and if it is affirmed by the consensus of other minds it could be acceptable as truly objective statements. Mentally constructed and assumed reality of the real nature of natural events could be debatable only among the scientists who get used to accept metaphysical assumptions of scientific models by like-minded scientists.

This scientific method is also a quest about the real essence and nature of reality but it pays attention to the external, sensible and comprehensible things ignoring the nature of mind who comprehends the things according to its own nature. Science investigates material world which is extended in space which is external and alien to the mind. It’s method and thinking tools are also

materialistic not only because it is about sensible world and it uses materialistic measurement tools to guarantee to make every observation objective but also its reasoning tools are a only capable of materialistic comprehension. i.e. in addition to materialist nature of sensation itself, semantic nature of the human language, logic and mathematical measurements are materialistic tools of thinking. Id est these thinking tools are not capable of comprehension other than material world though language itself and mathematics are ideal examples of pure metaphysical entities.

If we try to understand the natureThere are two aspects of relity, one is the perceivig and comprehending mind the other one is whatsoever comprehended by that mind. Science chooses and investigates Natural events, material objects and makes a comprehension of these events so properly in accord with scientific principles that they must be objective and to its testable. Unfortunately there are some aspects of reality and some different events of nature that they are not proper at all for objective statements and tests, not only unavailable for scientific understanding bu also  discordant with usual thinking tools of mind. i.e. they do not agree with semantics of usual language or logic. Neither they are proper for mathematical measurements.

We have to understand that our languge, thinkinking tools of philosophy and science as semantics, logic and mathematics are not suitable to understand those events including mind itself which uses them to comprehend itself and reality of the sensible outer/alien world.

Mathematics can prove, science can test the results of their reasoning. But they are suitable to investigate only the material things, things that are extended in space, pertaining to space they must remain permanent in space at least for some time. What if unpermanent things, events pertaining only to time or mind,for example if they have no material substance, how science or philosophy can comprehend such events. For example consciousness might come into existence in brain but it is not permanently located in Brain but it is a network of electrical discharges of some neurons of that brain which is swiftly fugitive in time, its contents always changing and never remaining in any loqui of Brain if not memorized, since it happens and cease to be in time. Causality is also an event of time.

What about other perspectives? Art, history, religious beliefs and feelings or mystical experience?

Unfortunately they are not provable or testable? You can feel instinctively about something but you cannot prove or test its existence ? According to Ibni Arabi müşahede(perception, observation) comes first, then muhakeme( analyses, conception and comprehension) gives us some knowledge about the nature of reality. According to İbn Arabi mükaşefe (mystical experience and feeling) gives a deeper knowledge about the real nature of events but the true nature of reality or the absolute truth

can be known only by God

is it true to divide reality into the spatial or temporal realities?

Nowadays scientists accept a spatio-temporal mode of reality as space-time. Events happen in a space-time continuum.

The logic as developed by Aristotle is materialistic by nature, it is static, but Ibni sina developed a modal logic which can discern and articulate the effects of time on the nature of things. Surely we need a modal logic to analyze the changing predicates of propositions about non material processes like mind.

Art already knows by imagination creatrix that there is an imaginatively dreamed existence which sometimes can be more real or at least more sensible and effective than the external world though it is not substantial at all. e.g. temporal arts like music.

 

 

İdentity crisis as wave particle duality and neutrinos

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VfEQKTb HYPERLINK “https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VfEQKTb7TTo”7 HYPERLINK “https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VfEQKTb7TTo”TTo

 

 

In normal situations the mind is aware of its self-identity,  its body and the content of its conscious and also aware of external world different from itself. The mind knows itself and its body from inside but it senses and feels by interpreting the impulses coming via sensory organs and inferring from these impulses that there exists an external and alien world besides the self’s own existence. Mind believes that there is an external world surrounding its body because the forces of that alien world affects it; its power inflicted upon mind via sensation felt sometimes as pain because of an alien power. There is vast space it can see with its eyes because of the so called electromagnetical radiation, hard solid matter or soft fluid matter it can touch, hot or cold weather it can feel, sounds coming from a distant place an inner sense of balance and movement gives it a sensation of the position of its own body etc. As a result of  feeling these forces all together it comprehends that these effects are caused by the forces of that external world. This is why it believes that there is an outer world over there which independent of our Mind.  Mind makes an impression of that world interpereting sense data and belives that it is as it is sensed by its sensory organs as an objective world. So the mind observes (müşahedat/observation) and perceives and then try to conceive and understand what does it mean, there is another deeper understanding of the Mind which intuitively becomes as a living experience internally felt and  because of that ecstatic feeling of upraising above ordinary experience leaves a strong conviction that there is a timeless and spaceless sameness/identicalness between the conceived impression of universal reality and the conceiving mind. It is a delight which comes from conceiving universal conceptions in spite of seemingly particular diversity of perceptions….The mind makes God knows how many inferences to conceive a conception from those perceived impulses coming via sensory organs and believes that there is an external world which causes all of these affections as sensed impressions and moreover inflicted upon mind sometimes as deeply felt pain. Therefore, according to this nature of Mind there is an internal world lived as life experience and that external world inferred as the cause of the sense affections. What is more, though the existence of external world is inferred from via sense impressions to the brain The mind accepts also that this external world could be envisioned and described wihout faltering in accordance with these affects and it is simply not only perceivable but also has an understandable structure. Then what?

Mind tries to comrehend the true nature of the forces inflicted upon it and what identity lies behind  these affects – these sense impression as the  causal identity. Affected by these external forces, mind believes not only the existence external world as  the causal source of  its sensations, but also conceives Time and Space in addition to this causality. Because there causality cannot be imagined without time. Eye sees the light and discerns material things extended in space as res extensa and one can touch feel the matter. So according to the strongly and clearly sensed affections of these external cause, there can be no doubt about the existence of causality, time, space and matter according to the conscious human mind. Then comes, as a matter of fact, to make sense of the observed events which happen in Time and Space with causality. These are the foundations of experimental sciences as strongly held non disputable beliefs about the true nature of existence.

 

See again matter and light L. De broglie

Individuum est inaffable

Particular things and events are perceivable. There is no need to understand them at first. You can observe them you can sense and perceive them.  But then you would need imagination to make conceptions, to make sense of them, if you try to understand a singular/particular thing you have to construct universal conceptions out of these particular events paying attention to identical or seemingly same details categorizing and weaving from these detailed impressions an abstract notion as a universal concept of identity. e.g. human, human-ness  instead of unique and singular human as ahmed. And moreover you have to make greater and greater abstracion levels and always climb that abstraction ladder higher and higher trying to comprehend the seemingly simple -perceptible- particular thing, to see by the mind’s eye more clearly than the natural eye though it would become impossible to envision any more these higher level abstractions as you can see clearly with eyesight… and to be sure you  will get lost at last.WYSWYG

Am I my mind? If not, what is my real self identity which lies hidden behind the selfness feeled as awareness  and sameness of selfhood of mind which enjoys itself and contemplates its objects? This is the question of self identity.

 

The one problem is the relation of mind to the living organism with which, or with a part of which, it is correlated.

 

 

What is the perception of an individual event? The queste bak…

 

we can imagine that the most simple event would be, by defini ition, a happening in the shortest intant of time and in the shortest dimensions of space i.e. in planck time and in a planck lenght which is smaller further than  the subatomic particles; everything else happening in a larger amount of time could be considered as a “becoming” in a series of time instants (or in a time duration) that is in a process of becoming a substance and coming into existence in time.

Let us begin with the simplest and the most fundemental event we can imagine…

matter is a substance which is strong enough to stay permanent some time in space, being substantive it has discernible dimensions even in atomic scale, i.e. every element of chemistry  in atomic scales as well have their own substantive  characters . matter/substance (or somata) has essentially discernible and measurable attributes, that is , it extended in three dimensions of space. At the subatomic level measurement becomes impossible because of the indeterminancy of sub atomic particles e. g. one can not determine both the position and time of an electron at the same time. indeed, if we can describe so,  the simplest possible event would happen in the shortest possible time and  nearly  in an infinitesimally tiny  place we can imagine: that could be an event which happens in planck time and at the planck length dimensions of space, that would be an event  more elemantary  even than the subatomic  particles. subatomic particles, e. g . a photon is much larger than planck scale. At that scale matter and subatomic particles begin to come into existence. Moreover, the events of atomic scale would have  much larger amount of time if compared to the planck scale and time,  I can imagine myself saying like string theorists that at that level also, being in time,there are some processes  like frequencies of  a played violine string, natural forces (gravity, electro magnetic field weak force and strong force) comes into existence as frequencies  of natural force fields and make what we call subatomic particles; they are held together by these four natural forces to make an elementary atom as a substance, as it was told by scientists.

In this framework of the description, even in a single atom of a chemical element, too many events happens as  natural processes proceeding in time; so that a substantive element, a material body within the dimensions of space comes into existence. it might be indeed a short time in that atomic scale but nevertheless it is a very long time if compared to planck time. This is what Descartes  calls as res extensa; extended things  a body/somata exists in spatial dimensions and parttakes a definite extension in space. Essential  nature of a body, that is the essence of any material body,  is that it extends in space. As imagined by physicist Max planck the shortest scale of this extension in space is Planck scale: the shortest distance of an extension as theorized by Planck.   Planck time   5.39121 × 10−44 s, Planck mass 2.17645 × 10−8 kg, Planck length (P) 1.616252×10−35 m. Theoretically natural events begins at this level, that is, “the substance” comes into existence as an atom in these scales…

In medieaval ages philosophers had used the word substance as the foundation of material bodies as if it was a synonym of the famous “a-tomos” of Democritus; a-tomos means undividable, the smallest  essence of matter. Muslim philosophers translated a-tomos as “cevher” to arabic and described it, such as “el-cevherü cüzün la yetecezza” substance (cevher) is the smallest part of a thing which is undividable any more. even today we use the word as finding “cevher” in the terminology of mining industry, meaning to find the substantial element of Chemistry , such  as iron or gold, in a mine. A-tomos, translated from Greek to Arabic as Cevher,  meaning the undividable  element of an extended body, that is most elemantary essence of a material body. what does it mean really is that if a body of thing is pure, say pure gold, every fundemental (undividable anymore) and smallest part of that gold, that is every gold atom is identical which each other.  Indeed, because of the natural forces which hold strongly the subatomic particles of an atom together, to divide an atom once more to the  more smaller parts i.e. to break an atom to the subatomic particles, one needs very high powers of energy, it was really impossible until the  20th century…We have to remember that nuclear weapons  have been used  first time in the course of Second World War,  by the United States  on 6 August 1945… Today we use particle accelerators, like hadron collider of CERN,  to direct subatomic particles involving collision of directed beams of Elementary particles to scatter particles of so called a-tomos…

Millions of atomic molecules could hardly be discernible as a tiny matter by the naked eye of a man, though rodes of the retina of a human eye is able to sense even 10 quanta of photons…

In one sense, may be it was a thought experience of antic greeks to find a fundamental, real essence and identity of the material bodies, they wondered what lies behind the res extensa, things that extended in the three dimensions of space. What was the ultimate reality behind the extended matter, the truth behind the “a-tomos” is that every single atom of an element  is that every atom of the same element is identical to each other. At this moment, we have to remember that the four elements of Greek philosophy, “earth, water, air and  fire”; and compare it to the periodical table of elements of the modern chemistry. According to the ancient people Water is the same fluent, liquid water everywhere, though there are diferences of Quality. you can not drink salted sea water like a sweet water of a source. But what is the fundamental nature of water. According to our modern chemistry knowledge it is H2o, made of one oxigen and  two hydrogen atoms and could be experienced as in solid, fluent or gaseous state at the same time in nature. Though ancient greeks has no idea about the elementary a-tomos, and real nature of water, we know that there are different kind of waters because of the different bonds of hydrogen and oxygen like H2o2, H2o3, Surely I shall not go into details but even Hydrogen atom could be a different kind of Hydrogen  from the usual hyrogen atoms, there are many different water models (H2o)n, with so much different qualities; consider heavy water D2o for example because it has a different isotrope of hydrogen  (symbolized with the letter D. Because of different isotrope ar allotropes of oxigen, (o1,o2,o3) and Hydrogen compounds of a water molecule, too many different kinds of waters come into existence,  so  all of them have many unimaginably diverse and suprising qualities. that is, even the elementary parts of any material as an atoms or molecules could be in different shapes (as an isotrope or allotrope) which have  very diverse qualities. so only same kind of the atom of any element could be considered as identical. o1 atom oxigen is identical only to other o1 isotropes of the same oxigen atom. Naturally Atomic oxygen (O1, a free radical) is not identical with Tetraoxygen (O4) at all , if you mean “to have same qualities” by identity .

What I am trying to say is that Identiy is a very simple but curious conception. In its deepest sense it means existence of itself or true essence of itself: it is,  “what-is” as called by Parmenides which means esse of the existence.  But what is “esse” ? is it true that “esse est percipi? I simply leave that conception of truth here, otherwise I will be forced to make a large digression from the context now at hand. I have to reiterate this problem of identity later in a more proper context since the concept of identity deserves a larger treatment. For instance,  The morning star and evening star is identical, it is the planet Venus, though ancient people had  thought that they were different stars because they did not know the fact that both of them in fact, are only different names for the same planet venus.  What we call morning star or evening star is simply planet venus. I could remind and tell the story of the ship of Theseus or what else? And for what use? Human Mind is not capable of proving even the simplest metaphysical concept of self identity, it cannot prove its own existence and identity either. If all the truth is found to be lies, then what?

 

While thinking about identity, even in the atomic and subatomic level you should take into account different qualities of the isotropes and allotropes of the same identical atoms. To find and decide about identity is not an easy job, even in the realm of atomic and subatomic scale, one needs so much and such a deep knowledge of physics and chemistry that is impossible to be attained in a short lifetime. Moreover I am also sure that the whole body of the knowledge of humanity is lacking to decide definitely on this simple subject as a matter of fact.  Probably, there are superficial differences about the modes of matter, though one needs a very large knowledge to be aware of them, if we go deeper into the heart of subject, we would be forced to accept that we are not sure of anything about matter. What is Time, what is space, or what is matter? What is causality? They are all susceptible conceptions if you look from a philosophical standpoint. Yet more, they have become more and more susceptible from the scientific viewpoint too and in spite of and also because of the unbelievable increase of experimental scientific knowledge thanks to the awesome technics and tools used nowadays such as particle accelarators…

How are we going to be sure about our knowledge, about anything indeed, if we cannot be sure about the identity of  the simplest material things. Hic iacet corpus scholium. in vino veritas! We need a philosopher of history who can understands the different standpoints of different disciplines; and why they differs between them is not the results of different perspectives  taken by diverse disciplines, but they all play diverse language games for divergent means and ends.To articulate what I mean by the diversive games of language  I will quote an illuminating passage from Oswald Spengler since he speaks more eloguently than me:

” Stand in a high wood of mighty stems while the storm is tearing above, and you will

comprehend instantly the full meaning of the concept of a force which moves

mass.

Out of such a primary feeling in the existence that has become thoughtful

there arises, then, an idea of the Divine immanent in the world-around, and

this idea becomes steadily more definite. The thoughtful percipient takes in

the impression of motion in outer Nature. He feels .about him an almost indescribable

alien life of unknown powers, and traces the origin of these effects to

“numina,” to The Other, inasmuch as this Other also possesses Life. Astonishment

at alien motion is the source of religion and of physics both; respectively,

they are the elucidations of Nature (world-around) by the soul and by

the reason. The” powers” are the first object both of fearful or loving reverence

and of critical investigation. There is a religious experience and a scientific

experience.

Now it is important to observe how the consciousness of the Culture intellectually

concretes its primary “numina.” It imposes significant words –

names – on them and there conjures (seizes or bounds) them. By virtue of

the Name they are subject to the intellectual power of the man who possesses

the Name, and (as has been shown already) the whole of philosophy, the

whole of science, and everything that is related in any way to “knowing”

is at the very bottom nothing but an infinitely-refined mode of applying the

name-magic of the primitive to the “alien.” The pronouncement of the right

name (in physics, the right concept) is an incantation. Deities and basic

notions of science alike come into being first as vocable names, with which

is linked an idea that tends to become more and more sensuously definite.

The outcome of a Numen is a Deus, the outcome of a notion is an idea. In

the mere naming of “thing-in-itself,” “atom,” “energy,” “gravitation,”

” cause,” “evolution” and the like is for most learned men the same sense

of deliverance as there was for the peasant of Latium in the words “Ceres,”

“Consus,” “Janus,” “Vesta.” “1

  1. O. Spengler, The Decline of the West, p.423

 

We are trying to comprehend the meaning of existence,  we make a quest to find a dependable solid truth,  because we are conscious of the natural forces, as any thoughtful human being takes in the impression of motion in outer Nature. This is why I concluded one of my articles “Man, Existence and Time” quote “something is moving. and colour of the water is the colour of its container” What can we discern outside our consciousness, as a matter of fact, we all too readily accept as a permanently fundamental reality which is an identifiable and  genuine reality which we can depend  it as a strong foundation for our actions. we feel moving forces of nature, we sense motion in time and infinitely large dimensions of  space which surrounds everything. The mind of a human being detects outer space and motion with its sensory organs, feels and thinks about the forces of nature, the outer space, and material objects, time and change and causes of the events. Minds natural tendency , it seems to me, is that it accepts what it senses and feels the content of its conscious awareness as unsuspectable reality and tries to understand everything reducing them to one cause, to one explanatory principle of identity. It tries to find an irreducible and hard base  of existence. Remember the Ancient Greeek Philosopher, Parmenides  who says that the reality (coined as “what-is”) is one, change is impossible, and existence is timeless, uniform, necessary, and unchanging..It is an endless quest for a changeless, imperishable truth. But time changes everything and if time is real then  “identical existence” of anything cannot remain permanent

Nihil fit ex nihilo: Nothing comes from nothing,  says by Parmenides. the concept of identiy seems simple enough. but it is not easy to hold secure in mind that the identity of anything remains permanently unchanging in spite of time. atomic theory of the ancient greek philosophers -like democritus- was an appropriate quest to find a reliable solid base for the natural events. nucleus of an atom splits into smaller parts (lighter nuclei). The is the fission process and it often produces free neutrons and photons (in the form of gamma rays), and releases a very large amount of energy. Since we have  built nuclear reactors and hadron colliders in this century, there is no reason to discuss the simple ideas of ancient greeks about a-tomos, but in fact, it is a deep metaphysical question about what I call “identity of nature” as spengler says in the aforementioned quotation it might be applying a “magic of naming” by a scientific game of language. Let us pay attention to the these scientific games of naming in Physics. Remembering the aforementioned words by Spengler:”The outcome of a Numen is a Deus, the outcome of a notion is an idea”

Why it is so hard to scatter an atomic nuclei and diffuse it to subatomic particles? What makes that nuclei so strong and resistant to frictions?  They tell us that there are four fundemental forces in nature, gravity, electromagnetism, weak nuclear force and strong nuclear force and they are trying to built a unified field theory to reduce these four forces to öne unified field theory. subatomic particles held together and made a very strong base of an atomic nuclei by these weak and strong  forces. weak force ( though it is unimaginably strong by the humanistic proportions) safeguards the nuclei to be scattered by any agent. but remember we made it possible by nuclear fission, that is two atomic bomb is used in 1945. Then what? we play game with subatomic particles nowadays to built a fussion reactor in France, that brings about much more and safe energy from what we call strong force, it is the the energy of Fusion power which is generated by nuclear fusion processes. here I will make a citation from wikipedia for the sake of a clear definition: “Fusion reactions are high energy reactions in which two lighter atomic nuclei fuse to form a heavier nucleus (in contrast with fission power where very heavy nuclei are split into lighter ones). In fusing, the nuclei release a comparatively large amount of energy arising from the binding energy due to the strong nuclear force, which manifests as an increase in temperature of the reactants and can be used to generate electricity. Fusion power is a primary area of research in plasma physics, where it is seen as a means of producing large scale cleaner energy.”

We not only speak but play the game  in subatomic world, though this tiny realm also is extended in space, but it partakes so tiny realm of  the space that it is impossible to observe. not only by naked eyes,  ıt is not observable even by electronic microscopes. What could be the smallest possible framework of space-time? it is the planck length and planck time. Since it is the tiniest space elongation much smaller even then a photon. and can you imagine the interval of planck time? it is the time duration which spent by light while travelling this planck length and remember light goes 300000 kilometre in one second, thatis why  it amounts only to  5.39121 × 10−44 second.  What could happen in such a small amount of time and space a theorized by Max Planck? Only one single and the most simple event of existence as ever imaginable. that event could not be considered as happening in a processing of time duration, since it is the tiniest instant of time. That is a  definitely a single event. Most simple event. since it happens in the shortest time and shortest distance imaginable. As it is theorized and worked out by the great phsicist Max Planck. Then What?

This most simple event should be considered as the most important event of all events in the history of this universe, since according to the theory of Max Planck, gravity, electromagnetism weak nuclear force,  and strong nuclear force,  all of them comes into existence in that scale; that means nature itself comes into existence as theses 4 different  force-fields  and brings into existence what we call matter. that is the singular unity of identity as the natural base and substance of this physical world. Then  it is the real self identiy which is timeless and dimensionless since time ,space, matter and  natural forces all come into existence -or I would prefer to say- appears in that infinitely small scale. I say infinitely, though it is not an infinite scale mathematically, but yet it is infinitely small Physically.   because before then there could be no time no space nor matter, according to this theoretical imagination of Max planck. etc., and etc…

That means the most simple and most important event of this universe because of the Nature itself coming into existence with aforementioned four forces of field and  constructing and sustaining those subatomic particles and the atomic nuclei…Nowadays theory of quantum mechanics and relativity theory can not be compromised wit each other. Every theorical phsicist is seeking to find a satisfactory unified field theory to unify these 4 forces and make one theory of everything. Those are the Numina’s of science as it was stated in the preceding quotation,”The pronouncement of the right-name (in physics, the right concept) is an incantation.” If the science Physic has not have a unified field theory of these 4 natural forces yet, which can bring them together consistently, so that science can explain about the natural base of matter and natural events.  Since we do not have an accepted theory which can unify and explains theses apparently non consistent and theories since they remain in uncomprimisingly in contradistinction to each other, I would rather interprete this situation as such that we apparently do not understand the real essence of the matter space and time. we have a large body of incoherent knowledge without real understanding. it seems  these ideas  about nature tested experimentally and  works so we can say they somewhat corresponds to reality because of the implications of some successful results. but what about all the problematic aspects of these theories?

We do not know why and how these 4 natural field of forces, gravity, electro-magnetism, weak and strong forces of matter within the atomic  nuclei,  would ne included all in one unified field of force since they have contradistinctive characterswith each other that seems to be uncompromisable. But this one unified field of forces is the Numina of Science; it is the the kind of naming employed by scientific language the most recent outcome of the scientific notions, which is exactly the the same “numen”(nomen) of Deus in religious language.

At this point, I would like to remind that according to Old Covenant that mystical force, or Deus,  when Moses asked the name of that Deus who spoken to him at Mount Sinai,  did not pronounce a Name(nomen) to Moses. (Naming is important in this semantic context, since every discipline plays a different language game.) Dixit Deus ad Mosen, “Ego sum Qui sum”:(ehyeh asher ehyeh)  “I am what will be I am.” This real name of God is held so sacred by the Jewish People that they do not use it in ordinary daily life, instead of this sacred name of God they say “Hashem” in daily life. That is

Nihil fit ex nihilo: Nothing comes from nothing. That means Nature is identical and explained with this one force (or Unified field theory of four forces) which brings forth the  existence. We understand why scientist prefere to use a different language, those  4 different names about the  forces of nature, namely gravity, electromagnetic field, weak force and strong force, come from scientific observations end experiments of natural events. we can feel the gravity and see the light. The light is explained and tested by the electromagnetic force, but the theories of the weak and strong forces of atomic nuklei  is developed   in the twentieth century and explained by the theory of   quantum mechanics, since only in this century we could delve deeply into the realm of atoms  and make technologically advanced experiments. As a result scientific explorations and experiments these explanations about the weak and strong forces related to atomic nuclei come into existence with Quantum mechanics. What holds together and makes possible these revolving planets and stars is explaned by the theory of  Gravity , as all physical bodies attract each other And  Gravity gives weight to physical objects and causes them to fall toward one another. Here is what Newton quote : “I deduced that the forces which keep the planets in their orbs must [be] reciprocally as the squares of their distances from the centers about which they revolve. and thereby compared the force requisite to keep the Moon in her Orb with the force of gravity at the surface of the Earth; and found them answer pretty nearly.” and he formulates famous equation Gravity Force. Newtonian  theory of Gravity  is successfully used to predict the existence of Neptune was accepted since then. Because science depends on this kind of observations and testing experimentations. The problem is Quantum mechanics is also works and verified by experiments related with atomic nuclei and subatomic particles but it is not comprising with the theory of Einsten’s Relativist theory of gravitation. It is a curious theory indeed with so many  unreasonable statements about subatomic worlds. This is why a unified field theory is needed about these contradistinct theories which hopefuly could explain what is light, what is matter why the moon planets and other stars revolves around the world or attracts each other.

It is clear now that these theories all about the forces we observe and feel; and consequently we wonder what is the ultimate explanation of these phenomenons and forces we experience. Human mind is consciously aware of itself and it senses and feels the affects of natural forces and moving Events occuring in the outer world, that is different from its self identity as outer world but surrounds and affects that mind  and its own body e.g. we feel gravtitational force by our sense of balance though we do not feel the movement of the earth. It is a quest for the real identity of the causes which move  and affect everything including in the first place our mind and body. I will not reiterate what spangler says about numinas (names) in the aforementioned Quotation but remember what God said to Moses: Ego sum qui sum: I am who I am,  I am  what I will be a self reflexive, self identifying name. Thanks to the developments in the twentieth century the substance of the matter has become less and less solid particles but wawering to become between to be a wave or particle, indeed considered both at the same time according to its affections,  weak and strong fields of force atomic nuclei (substancially) and solid hard matter only in its aspects of mod and attributes. substancially it has become the mysterious forces of nature and identical with the immanent God (say if you prefer scientific naming, ” unified field of natural forces”) or what is called substance by Spinoza. This is why this immanent Deity of Spinoza is much liked by some mystics and some scientists like Einstein. That means the quest of the scientific exploration also goes to  find one trustworthy identiy which is capable to explain the ultimate reality of Being.”

If we are not sleeping, dreaming or day-dreaming, We are always sure of ourselves , our self identiy, when we are consciously self aware of our selfness we are also aware of a different existence, the outer and foreign world of res extensa according to our Mind which is perceivable but not understandable. Mind perceives an external world by the use of its sensory organs which is extended in space and continues in time; and this foreign external world not only perceivable but has some  natural forces which affect our body and  soul. The question is what are those strange forces that is completely alien to the inner life of mind; they are in the outer and external world and surely different from the self-identity of the mind,  since they are perceived by the sensory organs of mind only because they affect our body and mind as foreign, unknown forces of a strange existence which surrounds our body. The mind of a human being is not only capable of perceiving and feeling, but also comprehending, quote william wordsworth “come forth and bring with you a heart that watches and receives” and because of this comprehension effort and ability it tries to discern the causes and sources of these foreign forces of outer world which affect its self identity, that is the mind and the body which belongs to its selfness. The light (electromagnetical force) affects the mind directly from the eyes. We get used to walk and have forgotten the old days of our efforts to learn how to stand by and walk while we were baby, but we can fall upon the earth easily and get our leg broken if our sensory organ of balance fails once, then we feel the force of gravity. We knew that the solid matter, a hard stone, can broke one’s head apart, we have tried to comprehend the natural identity of matter as a-tomos and in 20th century we get used to play with subatomic particles; as a result  we try to comrehend the real nature of weak and strong forces of the nature  which holds together the subatomic  particles to construct and sustain an atom, the smallest element of matter. We are as human beings constantly aware and conscious of these forces since they always affect and sometimes not only matter  but also light can injure our body, our eyes. There comes the question What am I? Who I am, what makes my self identity different from this whole existence the outer world which could affect my mind and body so strongly with strange forces. This is why we try to comprehend the ultimate reality both as the self-identity of our mind since we are conscious that it is  diverse from the external world, and also the ultimate reality of nature as to identify the real cause of those natural forces which affects us so strongly. So much  so that We are forced to live in accord with these unbreakable forces of natural laws never capable of breaking these laws…

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Kullanılacak excerptler için  annex………………

nur ayeti: reconstruction 62f

alem egodur diyor i.v.z daki gibi

self in the light of relativity dar 398

 

 

 

 

 

literal:

The secrets eternal neither you know nor I
And answers to the riddle neither you know nor I
Behind the veil there is much talk about us, why
When the veil falls, neither you remain nor I.

 

Categoriler discreete mi olacak continuum mu

Sayılar işık şuur zaman d/c

Duree

Continuus olduğu zaman eg line discreet continuum dönüşüyor light foton ama devamlılık ve sonsuzluk sebebiyle dalga oluyor gibi uzaktaki cisimden o ışığın gözüme yansıması için sonsuz sayıda foton gerekir daire üzerindeki nokta sayısı gibi zaman ve duree gibi

Ve hatta cantordaki gibi sonsuz kere sonsuz sayıda e.g. daire ve CH

D+CH

 

Sayılar aslında continuum olduğu ve 10luk discreet sembollerle ifada edildi için inconsistent olmuyor mu2li system sadace alfabe değirirmek continuum yani sonsuzu sonlu sayıda olmak zorunda olan discreet tabii satılara indirm işlemi paradoksların katnağı olamaz mı

Fisagorcuların sayıların ahengine inanması dicreete olanı biraz Cnt yapnış olur mu lambda daki mesla1248/3927

Tel boyunun taksimatı geometriden sayıların ihracı

ZAMAN CONTİNUUM olmak zorunda

Discreete olanın hüviyetin ve mahiyetin self identical discreet atomların araştırılması uzayın zamanın sebeplerin maddenin ve işığın dicreete reductionism ile anlaşılmak istenmesi

Müziğin continuum notaların perdelerin discreet olması gibi.bak waking life ama notalar yetmiyor

Göz kulak meselesi

Discreet olan continuum olani sayısı cinsi vasıfları ne kadar tarif ve tadad edilse de ifadeye yetmez

Individuum holism meselesi

Varlık birdir bölünemez. CNt/Varlık discreet yapılarin toplamıdır

Şuurun ve Zihnin matematiğin mantığın ve lisanın anlaşılma şartını reductionism ve materialism olarak görmesi

Individuum ve holism

Madde parçacıkların alanine kadar gidince discreeten wave ve yani continuuma dönüşüyor

Fisagora ilham olunan ne ahenk ve sayıların sebepliliği

 

Dicreete elementleri enerjini heyulayı atom ve yine eberjinin atomları pişirerek imal etmesine benzetiliyor

toprak çamur porselen gibi

tabii sayılar discreet ama kök2den beri durmadanyeni sayı çeşitleri icad etmek zorunda kaldık sonsuzu sonlu terimler ile ve nteticeyi discreet sebeple izah gayreti

sayılar C diye c. hipotezini eklemek matematiği ne kadar değiştirebilir mesela C H varlığı veya yokluğu niye ispatlanamıyor

numbers=causality=time =continuum ve

varlığın birliğine kadar gider

zaman mekan madde ışık causality ve zamanın discreete ifadeleri olur mu veya kendileri DSc olabilir mi

şuur maddi dünyayla ve kendi continuum ile muhatab oluyor  ferdiyet individuality discreet olmak zorunda

uniformity ve CH

zaman kesikli ve farklı hızlarda olamaz. Dişarıda bir dünya ve discreet unsurlar individuliteler var ama ben devamlıyım şuurundan zaman ve dış dünya ve onların conception abstraction vasitasıyla anlaşılabileceğine inanç egonun kendi şuuru hakkındaki tecrübesinden dogma inançlar

göz ve dokunma ile madde ve ışığı kulak ve şuurun temadisi ile zaman idraki

varlık eşittir:sonlu sayıda discreet elemanın toplamı

varlık eiştir tek bir holistic bütünlük

personality ilmi

self identity personal identity identity meselesi değil egonun asli hüviyet ve mahiyeti meselesi

mantık dil ve matematiğin discreet unsurlara yönelişi şuurun dış dünya tecrübesinin materyalism telkini ve dilin instituonalisminden mi çıkıyor şuurun kendi devamlılık ve duree yani zaman olduğu içi CH problem çıkar mı

dil mantık ve matematik innate olabilir mi olursa neden

farklı ve ayni

ben varım

ben olmayan nesneler ve farklı benlikler var dışımda

benim varlığım zaman ve vücudüm içinde devamlı yanı C zaman var

yabancı tabiat güçlerinin hissettirdiği farklı varlık/varlıklar yani farklilik discrimination vardır

discriminative descriptive olarak farkli individualiteler vardır

individual olanları isimlendir tasnif et dil sayesinde hiyerarşi ve instituitşonlar inşa et

akşamki konuşmanın özeti

consc. Süzgeci, zihni süzgeç dil ve abstraction süzgeçleri

metafizk zihni construction ile realitenin anlaşılma ve tasviri cehdi SML ilim felsefe

egonun/ruhun yönlendirme ve damgası th.ribot  dna ve yapı dahil her türlü önceden var olan irsi yönelim irsiyet yalnız dna da değil dil ve tkültürün teşkil ettiği atavistic cognition alet ve arşivinde de var

amma egonun instinction ve intuition kabiliyeti de var

identity den personal identity ye oradan personaliteye ve ruh kavramına geçiş on the soul Avicenna

 

kendi varlığından şüphe edemeyen şuur uyku rüya

 

particular/individual/ Singular (which means the identity of a thing in itself) versus universal/ holistic identity (conceptual beings like society)  like number (which is individual) versus general number theory  perception and conception: individuum (est ineffable) xUniversal

“Forma substantialis totius non superadditur partibus, sed est totum complectans materiam et formam cum praecisione aliorum”:”Nothing is added to the whole of the substantial form by the parts that constitute it, but it is the whole that embraces both content and form while maintaining the precision of the different parts that constitute the whole.” aquinolu st thomas
Foundational and accidental, physicalist monism, ultimate structure of matter

Beliefs about nature

Fact, event, process

Particular universal individualism/reductionism-holism

Discrete and continuum

Time space causality substance

Monism dualism and bifurcated existence

Fork like existence  space-time space time out of space-time

 

Metaphysics All happens in time except God

What remains permanent in spite of time

Energy, substance, movement, causality, gravity, action at a distance, weak force, strong force, wave-particle duality electro magnetic field synchronical co-existence and diacronical events of time

Space time substance identity causality, unity

Discrete and continuum

essence, unity, goodness, truth, thing, and something (Latin ens, unum, bonum, verum, res, and aliquid).